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The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
—U.S. CONST. amend. XIX 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1149 
I. BACKGROUND: BARRIERS TO THE BALLOT ...................................... 1151 
A. Felon Disenfranchisement .......................................................... 1151 
B. Military Voting ............................................................................ 1158 
II. “ON ACCOUNT OF SEX”: WHY AND HOW THE NINETEENTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN ...................... 1166 
A. Why: The Gender-Neutral Nineteenth Amendment .................... 1166 
B. How: The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power .............. 1168 
1. Scope of the Enforcement Power............................................ 1168 
2. Appropriate Enforcement Targets ........................................... 1170 
III. NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION TO 
 
*B.A. cum laude, The George Washington University, 2008; J.D. magna cum laude, Florida State 
University College of Law, 2014; currently serving in a judicial clerkship at the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York under the supervision of Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto, U.S. District 
Judge. This Article reflects solely my own views and does not necessarily reflect those of the federal 
judiciary or any judicial component or judicial officer. Thanks to (in alphabetical order) Travis Crum, 
Denver Governor, Rick Hasen, Don Inbody, Leah Litman, Ken Lineberger, Michael Morley, Mark 
Seidenfeld, and Mark Spottswood for their helpful feedback, as well as to Keith Savino and the late 
Dan Markel for their comments and feedback on an earlier work that I incorporated into this Article. 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Dan Markel, see Keith L. Savino, In Memoriam, A Tribute 
to Professor Dan Markel, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9, 12 (2014), who encouraged me to explore the 
ideas presented here. Additional thanks are due to the editors of the Seattle University Law Review, 
whose work—in the midst of a global pandemic—immeasurably improved this Article. I bear sole 
responsibility for all errors. 
1148 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1147 
PROTECT THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN .............................................. 1173 
A. Legislation Concerning Felon Disenfranchisement ................... 1173 
1. Burden on Men vs. Women..................................................... 1173 
2. Political Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement........................ 1174 
3. Reintegration into Society ...................................................... 1176 
4. Felons, Fatherhood, and the Family........................................ 1178 
5. Potential Legislative Remedies ............................................... 1179 
B. Legislation to Protect Military Voters......................................... 1181 
1. Burden on Men vs. Women..................................................... 1181 
2. Political Impact of Military Voters ......................................... 1181 
3. War Effort ............................................................................... 1185 
4. Dads on Deployment and Fatherhood in the Field: Military 
Families ....................................................................................... 1185 
5. Potential and Existing Legislative Remedies.......................... 1186 
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS ................................................................... 1195 
A. Scope: Purposeful Discrimination vs. Disparate Impact ........... 1195 
1. Intratextualist Analysis ........................................................... 1196 
2. Legislative and Judicial history .............................................. 1198 
B. Standard of Review: “Congruence and Proportionality” Versus 
“Reasonable Relation” ...................................................................1202 
1. Intratextualist Analysis ...........................................................1203 
2. Legislative and Judicial history ..............................................1207 
C. Federalism: State Power vs. Congressional Authority ...............1209 
1. Elections Clause ......................................................................1210 
i. Non-Federal Elections ........................................................ 1211 
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses ..............................................1214 
2. War Powers .............................................................................1220 
i. Continuity of Government ...................................................1220 
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses ..............................................1221 
iii. Non-Federal Elections ......................................................1224 
3. Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power ..........................1226 
4. Twenty-sixth Amendment Enforcement Power ......................1230 
D. Caselaw: Howard v. Gilmore .....................................................1231 
E. Politics: The Unlikelihood of Restrictive State Action ...............1233 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................1235 
 
2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1149 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts, legislators, and scholars alike have essentially forgotten the 
Woman Suffrage Amendment.1 The prevailing view is that the provision 
merely requires that states extend the franchise to women on equal terms 
with men: because states long ago complied with the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s mandate, the prevailing view holds, the provision possesses 
only historical significance, with little or no modern relevance.2 Most 
court decisions concerning the Nineteenth Amendment consist of mere 
perfunctory rejections of undeveloped, unsupported arguments by pro se 
litigants.3 Those few legal scholars who discuss the Nineteenth 
Amendment focus on its impact in areas other than voting.4 
Several years ago, I offered a (surprisingly) novel take on the 
Nineteenth Amendment: that a provision protecting “[t]he right . . . to 
vote”5 can and should play a role in protecting the right to vote.6 Noting 
that “[i]n recent years, states across the country have engaged in an 
extraordinary effort to make it harder to register to vote, to cast a ballot, 
and to have that vote counted,” I observed that “the extent to which these 
restrictions on voting may disproportionately affect women had gone 
 
 1. See Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (But First, Which One Is 
the Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507, 508–09 (2016). In fact, I settled on 
the “Which One?” subtitle when I noticed that it was everyone’s first question when I discussed the 
article with others. Known at the time of ratification as the “Woman Suffrage Amendment,” the 
provision became the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See Ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, 41 Stat. 1823, 1823 (1920). Although today’s terminology refers to “women’s suffrage” 
using a plural possessive noun, the language of the era used a singular, non-possessive noun: “woman 
suffrage.” See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, at 1 (1919). 
 2. See Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 
YALE L.J.F. 450, 451 (2020). 
 3. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Newark Hous. Auth., 515 F. App’x 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2013); Chapman 
v. Baker, 430 F. App’x 731, 731 (10th Cir. 2011); New v. Pelosi, 374 F. App’x 158, 159 (2d Cir. 
2010); Kohnke v. Reed, 18 F.3d 936, 1994 WL 83724, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 4. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 509 n.7. The literature criticizes this focus of scholarly attention 
away from the Nineteenth Amendment’s application to voting. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, 
the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, so Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten 
Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1420–25 (2014) (book review). The Nineteenth Amendment 
has received more scholarly attention due to the 2020 centennial celebration of the provision’s 1920 
ratification, but not all of the new literature considers the provision’s impact on voting. Compare Neil 
S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the Centennial, 27 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 252 (2020), with Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick 
Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108 
GEO. L.J. (19TH AMEND. SPECIAL EDITION) 27, 55–59 (2020). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 1. 
 6. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 572. Discussions in this Article of the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
legislative history and background legal principles stemming from the Fifteenth and Eighteenth 
Amendments draw heavily from this earlier work. See infra Sections II.B, IV.A.2, IV.B.2, and 
IV.C.1.ii. 
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largely unnoticed.”7 To combat these barriers to the ballot, I defended a 
robust interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
as a bulwark against efforts to restrict access to the franchise 
disproportionately impacting women.8 Importantly, I left open  
“the possibility that the Nineteenth Amendment could protect the voting 
rights of men.”9 
This Article—part of the Seattle University Law Review’s 
symposium on the centennial of the ratification of the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment—examines that open possibility. Concluding that the 
Nineteenth Amendment does protect men’s voting rights, this Article 
explores why and how that protection empowers Congress to address felon 
disenfranchisement and military voting. This Article also examines the 
advantages of using Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
compared to legislation enacted under other constitutional provisions. 
Part I discusses the unique barriers to voting faced by voters with 
criminal convictions (Section I.A) and voters in the armed forces (Section 
I.B). This Part also explains how existing efforts to address the voting 
rights of these two populations have fallen short. 
Part II covers the Nineteenth Amendment itself. This Part explains 
why the Woman Suffrage Amendment protects men’s voting rights 
(Section II.A). It also examines the congressional power to enforce those 
rights (Section II.B.1), including how Congress is most justified in 
targeting voting barriers which impact electoral outcomes, full 
participation in society (especially in a war effort), or caregiving and the 
family (Section II.B.2). 
Part III demonstrates that the Nineteenth Amendment empowers 
Congress to tackle the barriers to voting posed by felon 
disenfranchisement (Section III.A) and military service (Section III.B).10 
This part shows that men make up the overwhelming majority of both 
 
 7. Id. at 510–11. For a discussion of specific barriers and their disproportionate impact on 
women, see id. at 510–29. 
 8. See generally id. The thirty-nine words of the Nineteenth Amendment are spread across two 
unnumbered paragraphs each consisting of a single sentence; the second unnumbered paragraph is the 
Enforcement Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2. This is unique among the constitutional 
amendments with enforcement clauses: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-
third, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments each subdivide into numbered sections, with 
each provision’s Enforcement Clause constituting its own numbered section. See id. amend. XIII, § 2; 
id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. XVIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; 
id. amend. XXVI, § 2. 
 9. Id. at 529 n.125. 
 10. This Article’s thesis—that the Nineteenth Amendment protects men as well as women and 
that it therefore empowers Congress to address both felon disenfranchisement and military voting—
should not be confused with a policy argument that Congress should take any particular action. To 
that end, this Article does not endorse or oppose any particular policy proposal concerning felon 
disenfranchisement or military voting. 
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military servicemembers and disenfranchised felons, and that the barriers 
attendant to both criminal convictions and military service correspond to 
all three areas of legitimate Nineteenth Amendment enforcement action. 
Part IV addresses possible objections. First, this part establishes that, 
whether or not the Nineteenth Amendment (like its Fifteenth Amendment 
constitutional counterpart) prohibits only purposeful discrimination, such 
a requirement poses no barrier to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation (Section IV.A). Second, this Part demonstrates that courts may 
subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to only 
deferential “reasonable relation” review, not the more stringent 
“congruence-and-proportionality” review courts apply to Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation (Section IV.B). Third, this Part 
discusses the disadvantages of relying on other constitutional authorities 
to address felon disenfranchisement and military voting and examines how 
the Nineteenth Amendment fills the gaps left by these other provisions’ 
shortcomings (Section IV.C). Fourth, this Part explains why the sparse 
though potentially adverse Nineteenth Amendment caselaw does not 
impact the analysis in this Article (Section IV.D). Finally, this Part 
contests the theory that the decreasing political popularity of  
felon disenfranchisement and the sustained popular support for military 
voters preclude the need for Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation (Section IV.E). 
I. BACKGROUND: BARRIERS TO THE BALLOT 
A. Felon Disenfranchisement 
As of 2019, forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia bar at 
least some individuals from voting on the basis of a felony conviction.11 
Some states disenfranchise only current or recently released prisoners, 
while other states also disenfranchise parolees and still others also exclude 
probationers.12 The remaining states disenfranchise some offenders even 
after the completion of their sentence.13 Sometimes the disqualification 
turns on the nature of the felony, the passage of time, the number of 
convictions, or the payment of financial obligations associated with the 
 
 11. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER, 
1–2 tbl.1 & fig.A (2019). 
 12. See, e.g., 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301(a) (2020) (prisoners); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2101(a) 
(2020) (parolees); TEX. ELEC. CODE. ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (2020) (probationers). 
 13. See CHUNG, supra note 11. 
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conviction.14 Some states bar all felons from voting.15 Many states offer a 
clemency process which can restore a disenfranchised person’s voting 
rights,16 although these procedures may not provide a realistic path to the 
ballot box.17 Even among those states where the restoration of voting rights 
is automatic, bureaucratic misunderstandings may, as a practical matter, 
preclude felons from registering to vote.18 
The result is that an estimated 6.1 million Americans were not 
eligible to vote in 2016 as a result of a felony conviction—up slightly from 
5.85 million in 2010 and up substantially from 3.34 million in 1996 and 
1.17 million in 1976.19 The current figure represents approximately 2.5% 
of the total U.S. voting age population, or 1 in 40 adults.20 The felony 
disenfranchisement rate also varied significantly from state to state: from 
a low of 0.21% (Massachusetts) to a high of 10.43% (Florida), while 
Vermont and Maine do not disenfranchise anyone on account of a felony 
conviction.21 Popular support for felon disenfranchisement is mixed.22 
Legal attacks on felon disenfranchisement laws have generally not 
succeeded.23 Absent unique circumstances,24 courts generally hold that 
 
 14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1(c) (2020) (nature); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-313(1) (2020) 
(time); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-907(A) (2020), 16-101(A)(5) (2020) (number); FLA. STAT. 
§ 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2020) (payment). 
 15. For instance, the Iowa Constitution disenfranchises any “person convicted of an infamous 
crime.” See IOWA CONST., art. II, § 5. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the term “infamous crime” 
included all felonies. See Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 205 (Iowa 2016). 
 16. See, e.g., VA. CONST., art. II, § 1. 
 17. See, e.g., Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1299–1300 (N.D. Fla. 2018), vacated as moot, 
946 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020); Nora V. Demleitner, Felon Disenfranchisement, 49 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 1275, 1286–87 (2019); Jennifer L. Selin, The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden 
Complicates Voting Rights Restoration Law and Policy, 84 MO. L. REV. 999, 1035 (2019); Emily 
Rong Zhang, New Tricks for an Old Dog: Deterring the Vote Through Confusion in Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 84 MO. L. REV. 1037, 1046–47 (2019). 
 18. See Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 417–424 (2011). 
 19. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: 
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3, 9 (2016). 
 20. See id. at 3. 
 21. See id. at 15 tbl.3. 
 22. Bruce E. Cain & Brett Parker, The Uncertain Future of Felon Disenfranchisement, 84 MO. 
L. REV. 935, 942–47 (2019); Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in 
the United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 283 (2004); Brian Pinaire et al., Barred From the Vote: 
Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1540–44 
(2003). 
 23. See Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R.6th 31 § 2 (2006). 
 24. For instance, a felon disenfranchisement provision violates the Equal Protection Clause when 
the state enacted the provision with the intent to discriminate against a particular racial group. See 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226–33 (1985); Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 
1321–24 (M.D. Ala. 2017). In certain circumstances, the Equal Protection Clause bars a state from 
disenfranchising a voter for conviction of a misdemeanor. See McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. 
Supp. 954, 973–76 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366–67 (N.D. Ala. 1977). 
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felon disenfranchisement provisions do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.25 Procedural due process claims generally fall flat.26 Most 
Fifteenth Amendment litigation meets a similar fate.27 Because courts 
often characterize felon disenfranchisement provisions as non-punitive 
voter qualifications rather than as a form of punishment for the underlying 
felony, challenges under the Bill of Attainder Clause,28 the Ex Post Facto 
Clause,29 and the Eighth Amendment30 rarely succeed. Neither the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause,31 the First Amendment,32 nor the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment33 poses a significant hurdle. Felon disenfranchisement 
 
Lower courts split on whether a felon disenfranchisement provision violates the Equal Protection 
Clause if it disenfranchises some, but not all, felons on the basis of their ability to pay the legal 
financial obligations associated with their criminal convictions. Compare Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 975 
F.3d 1016, 1028–37 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), with Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 825–28 (11th 
Cir. 2020) (per curiam), and Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1331–32. 
 25. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); see also Jones, 975 F.3d at 1028-37; 
Wilkins v. County of Alameda, 571 F. App’x 621, 632 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 
742, 746–50 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 172 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 
405 F.3d 1214, 1223–27 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 F. App’x 199, 202–
03 (10th Cir. 2002); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391–92 (5th Cir. 1998); Perry v. Beamer, 99 
F.3d 1130, 1996 WL 614688, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Buckner v. 
Schaefer, 36 F.3d 1091, 1994 WL 521012, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1994) (unpublished table decision); 
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262–63 (6th Cir. 1986); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27–28 (3d 
Cir. 1983); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114–15 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 26. See Jones, 975 F.3d at 1048–49; Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 514–15 (5th Cir. 1982). 
But see Thompson v. Alabama, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1305–06 (M.D. Ala. 2019). 
 27. See Malnes v. Arizona, 705 F. App’x 499, 500–01 (9th Cir. 2017); Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 
814, 822 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated on reh’g, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262–63. 
But see Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1321–24 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
 28. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (dicta); Green v. Bd.  
of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 449–50 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 
1328–30. 
 29. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42–45 (1st Cir. 2009). But see Thompson, 293 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1328–30. 
 30. See, e.g., Green, 380 F.2d at 450–51; Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119–20 (M.D.N.C. 
1972) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 411 U.S. 961 (1973). But see Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 
1313. 
 31. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 32. See, e.g., Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1210–13 (11th Cir. 2018); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 
Civ. 8586 (LMM), 2004 WL 1335921, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 449 
F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006), and 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 
1338 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 33. See, e.g., Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1037-39 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Johnson, 
624 F.3d at 751–52; Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 405 
F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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laws generally withstand Voting Rights Act challenges.34 With limited 
exceptions,35 litigation under state law has not succeeded.36 
Beyond the judiciary, other branches of government have taken only 
limited action to address felon disenfranchisement. Despite committee 
hearings,37 floor consideration,38 and even passage of a bill in one 
chamber,39 Congress has not enacted legislation that would prohibit states 
 
 34. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Simmons, 
575 F.3d at 42; Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson, 405 F.3d 
at 1234; Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated for lack of standing, 449 F.3d 
371, 376–77 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); 
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d 329, 331 n.1 
(5th Cir. 1965). A fact-specific claim under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et 
seq.—concerning a state voter registration form’s language relating to felon eligibility—survived a 
motion to dismiss. See Thompson v. Alabama, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1309–10 (M.D. Ala. 2019). 
 35. See Sterling v. Archambault, 332 P.2d 994, 995 (Colo. 1958) (en banc); Crothers v. Jones, 
120 So.2d 248, 254–56 (La. 1960); State v. Rappaport, 128 A.2d 270, 273 (Md. 1957); Mixon v. 
Commonwealth, 783 A.2d 763, 763 (Pa. 2001) (mem.); Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tenn. 
1983). 
 36. See Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 192 (5th Cir. 2010); Johnson, 624 F.3d at 752–54; 
Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1080–81; Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 390–91 (5th Cir. 1998); Williams v. 
Lide, 628 So.2d 531, 533–34 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam); Merritt v. Jones, 533 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Ark. 
1976); Jarrard v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Registrars, 425 S.E.2d 874, 875 (Ga. 1993), overruled on 
unrelated grounds, Cook v. Bd. of Registrars of Randolph Cnty., 727 S.E.2d 478, 483 (Ga. 2012); 
Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 788 (Ind. 2011); Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 198–205 (Iowa 
2016); Dane v. Bd. of Registrars of Voters of Concord, 371 N.E.2d 1358, 1372 (Mass. 1978); 
Middleton v. Evers, 515 So.2d 940, 944 (Miss. 1987); Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445, 449 (Mont. 1978); 
Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321, 330 (N.H. 2000); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 
450 (N.M. 1968); Hughes v. Okla. State Election Bd., 413 P.2d 543, 545–46 (Okla. 1966); Bailey v. 
Baronian, 394 A.2d 1338, 1344 (R.I. 1978); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 763–66 (Wash. 2007); 
Mills v. Campbell Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 707 P.2d 747, 750–51 (Wyo. 1985). 
 37. In 1999, a House of Representatives subcommittee held hearings on bills to abrogate certain 
state felon disenfranchisement provisions. See Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: 
Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 1 (1999). The renamed subcommittee held a hearing on a successor bill in 2010. See Democracy 
Restoration Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3335 Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010). In 2014, a Senate 
subcommittee held a hearing on several bills, including a bill concerning felon disenfranchisement. 
See The State of Civil and Human Rights in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const., Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 23 (2014). 
 38. During the 2002 debate on an election reform bill, the Senate voted by a two-to-one ratio to 
reject an amendment which would abrogate state felon disenfranchisement provisions in federal 
elections except for voters serving a felony sentence of incarceration, probation, or parole. See 148 
CONG. REC. 1501 (2002) (recording a 31–63 vote to reject the amendment); see also id. at 1489 (text 
of amendment). 
 39. In 2019, the House of Representatives passed an omnibus election reform bill which, among 
other things, provided that a U.S. citizen’s right “to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be 
denied or abridged because that individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless such 
individual is serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility at the time of the 
election.” H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1402 (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); see also 165 CONG. 
REC. H2602 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2019) (recording a 234–193 vote for passage of H.R. 1). The Senate 
has precluded further action on the bill. See 165 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019) 
(statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); see also S. DOC. 101-28, at 244 (1992). 
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from barring individuals from voting on the basis of a criminal 
conviction.40 Felon disenfranchisement is an increasingly visible issue in 
state legislatures, but reform efforts have had mixed results.41 Unilateral 
action by state executives was more successful.42 However, unilateral 
executive action can be vulnerable to litigation or reversal by the successor 
state executive.43 Even popular referenda can fall victim to judicial or 
legislative interference.44 
Felon disenfranchisement has spawned a vast literature.45 Most of the 
discussion has concerned constitutional claims—the First,46 Eighth,47 
 
 40. Neither chamber in the present 116th Congress has taken action on stand-alone legislation. 
See Democracy Restoration Act of 2019, H.R. 196 § 3 (2019); Democracy Restoration Act of 2019, 
S. 1068 § 3 (2019). 
 41. See Jason Belmont Conn, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the 
Legislatures, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 516–36 (2005). Compare An Act Concerning the Voting 
Rights of Persons Serving a Sentence of Parole, ch. 283, sec. 5, § 1-2-101(3), 2019 Colo. Laws 2642, 
2644, and An Act Relative to Registration and Voting, ch. 636, sec. 1, § 18:102(A)(1)(b), 2018 La. 
Acts 1970, 1970, and Felony Voter Disqualification Act, ch. 2017–378, sec. 1, § 17-3-30.1(e), 2017 
Ala. Laws 1204, 1208, with James Drew, Bill to Restore Felons’ Voting Rights Faster Dies, OLYMPIAN 
(Olympia, Wash.), Feb. 21–22, 2020, at 3A, and Stephen Gruber-Miller, Senate GOP Denies Passage 
of Voting Rights Amendment, DES MOINES REGISTER, June 15, 2020, at 2A. 
 42. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 7, at 2 (Iowa Aug. 5, 2020); Exec. Order No. 181 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 
2018). Unilateral state executive action has its critics. See Amanda J. Wong, Note, Locked Up, Then 
Locked Out: The Case for Legislative—Rather Than Executive—Felon Disenfranchisement Reform, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1679, 1701–13 (2019). 
 43. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 724–25 (Va. 2016); Exec Order No. 2015-052 § 1 
(Ky. Dec. 22, 2015), repealed, Exec. Order No. 2019-003 § 11 (Ky. Dec. 12, 2019); Exec. Order No. 
70 § I (Iowa Jan. 14, 2011). But see Lindsey Turok, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe: Felon 
Disenfranchisement in Virginia and the “Cautious and Incremental Approach” to Voting Equality, 28 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 341, 342–43 (2018). 
 44. See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2019); Adv. Op. re: Voting Restor’n Amend., 288 So. 
3d 1070, 1084 (Fla. 2020). 
 45. See, e.g., ELIZABETH HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 17 (2006); JEFF 
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 7–9 (2006); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 8 
(2d ed. 2013). 
 46. See, e.g., Erika Stern, “The Only Thing We Have to Fear is Fear Itself”: The Constitutional 
Infirmities With Felon Disenfranchisement and Citing Fear as the Rational For Depriving Felons of 
Their Right to Vote, 48 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 703, 752–54 (2015); Anthony Gray, Securing Felons’ 
Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 28–30 (2014); Janai S. Nelson, 
The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. 
L. REV. 111, 171–72 (2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Rebecca Harrison Stevens et al., Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority Voting 
Power Through Prison Gerrymandering and Felon Disenfranchisement; 21 ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON 
RACE & SOC. JUST. 195, 216–23 (2019); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised 
Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 136–42 (2005); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1164–69 (2004). 
1156 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1147 
Thirteenth,48 Fourteenth,49 Fifteenth,50 or Twenty-Fourth51 Amendments, 
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments combined,52 the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause,53 the Elections Clause,54 the Bill of Attainder 
Clause,55 or the One-Person-One-Vote56 principle. Other commentators 
have debated claims under the Voting Rights Act.57 Some of the literature 
has even touched on the applicability of international law.58 The role of 
 
 48. See, e.g., Alec Ewald, Escape From the “Devonian Amber”: A Reply to Voting and Vice, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 319, 337–39 (2013); Shadman Zaman, Note, Violence and Exclusion: Felon 
Disenfranchisement as a Badge of Slavery, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 277 (2015). 
 49. See, e.g., Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of 
Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 783–89 (1998). 
 50. See, e.g., Kyrstal J. Williams, Criminal Disenfranchisement: Taking a Closer Look at 
Fifteenth Amendment Remediation, 2 HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION L. REV. 73, 111 (2009); Marc 
Edwards Rivera & Shimica D. Gaskins, Note, Previous Conditions of Servitude: A Fifteenth 
Amendment Challenge to Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 
153, 162 (2008). 
 51. See, e.g., David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 423–26 (2011); Allison R. Hayward, 
What Is an Unconstitutional “Other Tax” on Voting? Construing the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 8 
ELECTION L.J. 103, 103–04 (2009); Ryan A. Partelow, The Twenty-first Century Poll Tax, 47 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 465 (2020). 
 52. See, e.g., John Crain, How Congress Can Pass a Felon Enfranchisement Law That Will 
Survive Supreme Court Review, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 60–63 (2019); Richard M. Re & Christopher 
M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 
YALE L.J. 1584, 1656–62 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the 
Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 259, 316 (2004). 
 53. See John Benjamin Schrader, Note, Reawakening “Privileges or Immunities”: An 
Originalist Blueprint for Invalidating State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 
1311–14 (2009). 
 54. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 166–68 (2001); 
Richard L. Hasen, The Uncertain Congressional Power to Ban State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 
49 HOW. L.J. 767, 783 (2006); Daniel M. Katz, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Voting 
Rights Act, and Restoration of the Congressional Portion of the Election Ballot: The Final Frontier 
of Felon Disenfranchisement Jurisprudence?, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 64–78 (2007); Hans A. von 
Spakovsky & Roger Clegg, Felon Voting and Unconstitutional Congressional Overreach, 85 MISS. 
L.J. 1373, 1379–83 (2017). 
 55. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses 
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1904–06 (1999). 
 56. See Katherine Shaw, Comment, Invoking the Penalty: How Florida’s Felon 
Disenfranchisement Law Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality in 
Congressional Representation, and What to Do About It, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1439, 1476–77 (2006). 
 57. See, e.g., Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement 
Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 61, 79–103 (2011); Thomas G. Varnum, Let’s Not Jump to Conclusions: Approaching Felon 
Disenfranchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109, 141–42 
(2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, Not a Mere Omission: Reconciling the Clear Statement Rule and the Voting 
Rights Act, 7 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 200–02 (2006). 
 58. See, e.g., John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the 
Eighth Amendment, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 789–96 (2013); John Reuven “Ruvi” Ziegler, Legal 
Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 197, 239–264 (2011). 
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legal financial obligations receives some attention.59 Commentators have 
explored both state-level activity and potential federal legislation.60 
Scholars have also discussed the theoretical justifications and policy 
consequences of felon disenfranchisement.61 So much scholarship exists 
on this subject that one experienced voting rights litigator wrote an entire 
article—”not about the policy or wisdom of such disenfranchisement laws, 
nor even about whether such laws would pass muster if measured  
against the Constitution and federal law—just about how courts have 
ducked these issues.”62 
Scant Nineteenth Amendment literature addresses felon 
disenfranchisement. One commentator contends that the Nineteenth 
Amendment operates to sub silentio repeal section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, on which the Supreme Court had relied to prohibit an attack 
against felon disenfranchisement under the Equal Protection Clause of 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Another scholar argues that “the 
history of debate over women’s suffrage sheds light upon the flaws in 
felony disenfranchisement legislation, both as a matter of public policy 
and constitutional rhetoric,” and that “[m]any of the same retorts used to 
defeat paternalistic anti-suffragist arguments and usher in the [Woman 
Suffrage] Amendment can be similarly deployed to undermine 
paternalistic arguments to disenfranchise felons.”64 A footnote by one 
commentator suggests in passing that, in light of a Supreme Court decision 
 
 59. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 
143–48 (2019); Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of 
Legal Financial Obligations, 6 J.L. STUDIES 309, 334 (2017); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony 
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 349, 405 (2012). 
 60. Compare L. Michael Berman, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 251, 
270–71 (2017), and Conn, supra note 41, at 516–36, and Lynn Eisenberg, Note, States As Laboratories 
for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 539, 582–83 (2012), and Brian McWalters, Note, A Vote for Those Who Can’t: Strategies for 
Felon Voting Rights Reform, 10 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 145, 151 (2018), with 
Christina Beeler, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Paying and Re-Paying a Debt to Society, 21 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1099–1102 (2019), and Otis H. King & Jonathan A. Weiss, The Courts’ Failure 
to Re-Enfranchise “Felons” Requires Congressional Remediation, 27 PACE L. REV. 407, 426–30 
(2007), and von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1375–76. 
 61. See, e.g., Cammett, supra note 59, at 405; Roger Clegg et al., The Case Against Felon Voting, 
2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–19 (2008); Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: 
The Fallacy and the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109, 142–43 (2004); Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon 
Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 93 (2006). 
 62. Armand Derfner, How the Courts Keep Ex-Felons Disenfranchised, 85 MISS. L.J. 1179, 1179 
(2017). 
 63. See John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157, 192–96 (2004); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 
24, 41–56 (1974). 
 64. Michael Gentithes, Felony Disenfranchisement and the Nineteenth Amendment, 53 AKRON 
L. REV. 431, 441 (2019). 
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“stating that the Nineteenth Amendment ‘applies to men and women 
alike,’” federal legislation abrogating state felon disenfranchisement laws 
“could potentially . . . be upheld under the Nineteenth Amendment, given 
that the overwhelming majority of felons are male.”65 No other scholarship 
discusses whether Congress may exercise its power under the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to abrogate state felon 
disenfranchisement provisions. 
B. Military Voting 
Unlike individuals with felony convictions, the country’s 
approximately 1.3 million active duty military personnel66 enjoy 
constitutional protection from outright disenfranchisement because of 
their military service.67 However, servicemembers nonetheless face both 
logistical barriers and legal hurdles when registering to vote or casting a 
ballot.68 “With frequent deployments to war zones, constant moves 
between duty stations, and confusing state absentee voting laws, military 
members face an uphill battle trying to register and request an absentee 
ballot.”69 Military voters’ “geographic distance from local election 
officials often magnifies the challenges of registering, receiving ballots, 
returning them, and having them counted.”70 State law, too, can create 
 
 65. See Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J. 
1168, 1230 n.274 (2012) (quoting Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937)). 
 66. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE 1 (Jan. 31, 2020) [hereinafter DMDC, TOTAL MIL. PERS. JAN. 2020] 
(on file with Seattle University Law Review). 
 67. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–97 (1965). 
 68. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th 
Cong. 39 (2013) (testimony of Matt Boehmer, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 
Department of Defense); DAVID MERMIN ET AL., FED. VOTING ASS’T PRGM., UNIFORMED AND 
OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT VOTING: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 73–77 (Nov. 
2014); Donald S. Inbody, Voting by Overseas Citizens and Military Personnel, 14 ELECTION L.J. 54, 
59 (2015). 
 69. HANS VON SPAKOVSKY & M. ERIC EVERSOLE, HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMO NO. 71, A 
PRESIDENT’S OPPORTUNITY: MAKING MILITARY VOTERS A PRIORITY 2 (July 19, 2011); see also 
Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 70. PRES. COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 59 (Jan. 
2014) [hereinafter PCEA REPORT]. 
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problems for military voters.71 Taken as a whole, the combined “result is 
that those barriers restrict practical access to a ballot.”72 
Even just the delivery of election materials to military voters or the 
return of those materials to election administrators can pose challenges.73 
For decades, policymakers have struggled to ensure that servicemembers 
can request, receive, and return ballots with enough time to ensure they 
arrive in election officials’ possession on or before the deadline to count.74 
The problem persists today. The Government Accountability Office 
identified the “unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots to and 
from [military] voters” as one of the primary election-related challenges 
facing servicemembers, especially for military voters without access to the 
military postal system or for U.S. Navy voters stationed at sea with limited 
technological connectivity.75 Transport issues often cause military voters’ 
ballots or registration applications to miss statutory deadlines, a major 
reason why election administrators rejected approximately 2.8% of 
military voters’ registration applications and 5.7% of military voters’ 
absentee ballots in the 2018 election.76 In fact, sometimes servicemembers 
do not receive their ballots at all: 4.3% of ballots transmitted to military 
 
 71. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th 
Cong. 39 (2013) (testimony of Matt Boehmer, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program); Federal 
Voting Assistance Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H.R. Comm. 
on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 12, 67 (2012); (testimony of Pamela S. Mitchell, Director, Federal 
Voting Assistance Program); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential 
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 
27–28, 39 (2009) (testimony of Rokey W. Suleman, II, General Registrar, Fairfax County Office of 
Elections); Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 59; Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 747, 761 (2016). 
 72. DONALD S. INBODY, THE SOLDIER VOTE: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE BALLOT IN AMERICA 89 
(1st ed. 2016); CLAIRE M. SMITH, CONVENIENCE VOTING AND TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF MILITARY 
AND OVERSEAS VOTERS 128–29 (1st ed. 2014). 
 73. See Paul S. Herrnson et al., Message, Milieu, Technology, and Turnout Among Military and 
Overseas Voters, 39 ELECTORAL STUD. 142, 143 (2015). The analysis leading to this conclusion 
includes overseas civilians. Id. 
 74. See Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the Subcomm. 
on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 34 (1952) (testimony of Col. Thomas B. 
Blocker, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education). 
 75. BRENDA S. FARRELL, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-16-378, DOD 
NEEDS MORE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING TO ADDRESS MILITARY AND OVERSEAS ABSENTEE 
VOTING CHALLENGES 18–19 (Apr. 2016); see also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 94, 
230–31 n.16. 
 76. U.S. ELECTION ASS’T COMM’N, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY: 2018 
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 92, 97 (June 2019) [hereinafter EAVS 2018 REPORT]. These figures can 
vary widely by election jurisdiction. See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez et al., Whose Absentee Votes are 
Returned and Counted: The Variety and Use of Absentee Ballots in California, 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 
673, 679 (2008); Thad E. Hall, Voting From Abroad: Evaluating UOCAVA Voting, in THE MEASURE 
OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 141, 163 (Barry C. Burden & Charles Stewart III, eds. 2014); Kosuke Imai 
& Gary King, Did Illegally Counted Overseas Absentee Ballots Decide the 2000 U.S. Presidential 
Election?, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 537, 538 (2004). 
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voters in connection with the 2018 election were undeliverable.77 
“Compared with a traditional absentee voter, [a military] voter is much 
less likely to return his or her absentee ballot and is much more likely to 
have a successfully returned ballot rejected and not included in the  
final tabulation.”78 
Beyond the practical challenges, servicemembers also face legal 
hurdles. For instance, social science evidence demonstrates that “state-
level procedural barriers also seem to hinder” military voters.79 
One major legal hurdle is determining a servicemember’s legal 
residence, also known as domicile.80 The Constitution permits states to 
restrict the franchise to bona fide residents of the state.81 “Unlike many of 
their civilian counterparts, military service members are in the unique 
position of having ties to many states.”82 “After all, service members 
frequently change homes pursuant to assignment orders,” and “have little 
predictability as to when they will receive military orders to a new duty 
location.”83 State law defining residence or domicile for voting purposes 
sometimes excludes those—like military personnel—who lack  
an intention to remain in the state indefinitely.84 Restrictive state  
domicile law could pose problems for servicemembers seeking to legally 
register to vote.85 
 
 77. EAVS 2018 REPORT, supra note 76, at 96. This figure also covers overseas civilian voters. 
Id. 
 78. Hall, supra note 76, at 163. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas 
civilians. See id. 
 79. Id. at 142. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas civilians. See id. 
 80. “Domicile” means “[t]he place at which a person has been physically present and that the 
person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person 
intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” Domicile, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “The words ‘domicile,’ ‘legal residence,’ ‘permanent home,’ and the 
like, are essentially interchangeable terms.” Thomas R. Sanftner, The Serviceman’s Legal Residence: 
Some Practical Suggestions, 26 JAG J. 87, 87–88 (1971). For purposes of state election laws, the use 
of the term “residence” usually means “domicile.” Mack Borgen, The Determination of Domicile, 65 
MIL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1974). 
 81. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978). For arguments 
that the Constitution requires states to restrict the franchise to bona fide residents, see Brian C. Kalt, 
Unconstitutional But Entrenched: Putting UOCAVA and Voting Rights for Expatriates on a Sound 
Constitutional Footing, 81 BROOK L. REV. 441, 457–462 (2016); Alan Gura, Ex-Patriates and 
Patriots: A Constitutional Examination of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 
6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 179, 185–87 (2001). 
 82. Wendy P. Daknis, Home Sweet Home: A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177 MIL. L. REV. 
49, 50 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 54 (“frequently change homes”); Dean W. Korsak, The Hunt for Home: Every Military 
Family’s Battle with Domicile Law, 69 A.F. L. REV. 251, 307 (2013) (“little predictability”). 
 84. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89–90 (1965); John M. Greabe, A Federal Baseline for 
the Right to Vote, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 62, 64-67 (2012). 
 85. Military voters do have some constitutional protections. For instance, states may not deny 
the vote to servicemembers because the state fears how servicemembers will vote nor because the state 
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The difficulties facing military voters are not new: throughout the 
nation’s history, the realities of military service have burdened voters in 
the armed forces, especially during wartime.86 Although Congress 
eventually enacted legislation to combat many of these barriers, the law 
has only recently come to support military voters. In fact, most military 
voters serving away from their home generally could not vote at all before 
the mid-Nineteenth Century because states conducted elections at in-
person polling places with no provision for absentee balloting.87 
Servicemember voting first saw wide-spread adoption during the 
Civil War when a host of states enacted laws authorizing voters serving in 
the military to vote from their duty station.88 As was typical of mid-
Nineteenth Century voting, election irregularities abounded.89 These 
experiments were short-lived: state courts invalidated many military 
voting statutes while others were repealed or expired.90 
By World War I, military voting laws existed in eighteen states.91 
However, military voting suffered even in these jurisdictions because the 
War Department refused to facilitate absentee voting in combat theaters, 
ensuring few soldiers in Europe’s trenches could participate in the 1918 
wartime midterm elections.92 For example, when New York assembled a 
 
faces the administrative difficulty of determining whether servicemembers qualify as bona fide 
residents. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93–97. 
 86. See, e.g., SEC’Y HENRY L. STIMSON, U.S. WAR DEP’T, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR 
TO THE UNITED STATES WAR BALLOT COMMISSION ¶¶ 32–33 (1944), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 79-
6, at 55–58 (1945); Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the 
Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 25 (1952) (testimony of Hon. 
Thad Eure, North Carolina Secretary of State). 
 87. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 2–3; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (rev. ed. 2009); SMITH, 
supra note 72, at 40–41. 
 88. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 4; KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 83; id. at 121; 
SMITH, supra note 72, at 40–42. For a more complete look at absentee voting during the Civil War, 
see JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL WAR 3–
26, 306–22 (1915); INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 13–44; Jonathan W. White, Canvassing 
the Troops: The Federal Government and the Soldiers’ Right to Vote, 50 CIVIL WAR HIST. 291, 298–
303, 309–11 (2004). 
 89. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 41–43; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY 
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 804–05 & n.69 (1988); White, supra note 88, at 303–09, 312–15, 
Oscar Osburn Winther, The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864, 25 N.Y. HIST. 440, 449–53 (1944). 
 90. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 47–49 & tbl.4.1; SMITH, supra note 72, at 41–
42; John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for 
Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 483, 496–99, 501 (2003); Pamela Karlan, Ballots and 
Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1345, 1351 (2003). 
 91. See P. Orman Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461, 461 (1918). 
Contemporary scholarship challenges this figure, arguing that “by 1918, nearly all states had made 
provisions for men serving in the military to cast their ballots, at least in time of war.” KEYSSAR, supra 
note 87, at 121. 
 92. See Letter from Adjutant Gen. H.P. McCain, U.S. War Dep’t, to Sen. James K. Vardaman, 
U.S. Senate (Apr. 22, 1918), reprinted in 56 CONG. REC. 5886 (1918); Thomas F. Logan, 
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six-member Overseas Election Commission to administer the state’s 
election for its voters stationed overseas, the War Department blocked the 
six commissioners from traveling to Europe to do so.93 
Following America’s entry into World War II, forty-five states 
permitted absentee balloting by military personnel, but the patchwork of 
state rules often presented considerable barriers to servicemembers hoping 
to cast a ballot.94 Congress attempted to standardize the process of  
military voting by enacting legislation in 1942, wartime amendments  
in 1944, and postwar amendments in 1946.95 Unfortunately, all three 
proved inadequate.96 
Following the war, military voters faced increasingly greater burdens 
when states repealed or allowed to expire many of the flexible registration 
and voting laws aimed at servicemembers.97 However, nearly a decade 
passed after World War II without any new military voting legislation.98 
Congress eventually took action with the Federal Voting Assistance Act 
of 1955 and subsequent amendments in 1968.99 These enactments issued 
 
Correspondence, Soldier Vote in War, 62 AM. ECON. 122, 122 (1918); see also INBODY, SOLDIER 
VOTE, supra note 72, at 52–53; SMITH, supra note 72, at 43. 
 93. Compare To Take Ballots to Men in France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1918, at 10, with Guns 
the Best Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1918, at 12. The War Department may have taken a more lenient 
view of states like Mississippi that chose to poll their deployed voters by mail-in absentee ballot. See 
56 CONG. REC. 5952–53 (1918) (statement of Rep. Pat Harrison). 
 94. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 56; SMITH, supra note 72, at 44; Boyd A. 
Martin, The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 720, 724–25 (1945). 
 95. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–15 (Supp. II 1942), amended by 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–03, 321–354 (Supp. 
IV 1944), amended by 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–03, 321–31, 341–42, 351–55 (1946) (repealed 1955). For an 
overview of each enactment, see PAUL T. DAVID ET AL., SPECIAL COMM. ON SERV. VOTING, AM. POL. 
SCI. ASS’N, VOTING IN THE ARMED FORCES (1952), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 15–18, 20–
21 (1952). 
 96. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 62–64, 68–71, 73–74; SMITH, supra note 72, 
at 45–46; Molly Guptill Manning, Fighting to Lose the Vote: How the Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and 
1944 Disenfranchised America’s Armed Forces, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 335, 353–54, 368–
71 (2016). 
 97. See Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the Subcomm. 
on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 75–76 (1952) (testimony of Paul T. David, 
staff member, Brookings Institution & member, American Political Science Association); DAVID ET 
AL., supra note 95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 21–22. The outbreak of conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula lead a minority of states to reverse course. See id. at 22–23. 
 98. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 75–78; SMITH, supra note 72, at 46–47. 
Congress did enact minor amendments in 1950. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 324(d), 329(a), 352 (Supp. IV 1950) 
(repealed 1955). 
 99. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2171–73, 2181–85, 2191–96 (Supp. III 1955), amended by 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1451–54, 1461–65, 1471–76 (Supp. IV 1968) (repealed 1986); see also DAVID ET AL., supra note 
95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 5–8. 
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a series of non-binding recommendations regarding military voting that 
states were free to ignore—and many did.100 
Congress began flexing its constitutional muscle in the Overseas 
Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 and its 1978 amendments.101 This 
statute obligated states to grant each otherwise-qualified voter residing 
outside the United States the right to vote in federal elections and to afford 
these voters absentee registration procedures and absentee ballots.102 In 
1978, Congress amended the Federal Voting Assistance Act to expressly 
require states to offer absentee registration procedures and absentee ballots 
to active duty servicemembers, whether stationed domestically or 
internationally.103 However, both the Federal Voting Assistance Act and 
the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act still left states to implement the 
laws as they saw fit. 
In 1986, Congress consolidated and updated the statutes concerning 
military and overseas civilian voting into the Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which governs military voting 
today.104 In contrast to the hands-off approach of earlier decades, federal 
law (including UOCAVA) now imposes a host of obligations on states, 
resulting in a wide range of legal protections for military voters.105 
These legal protections for military voters spawn some litigation. 
While litigants file fewer cases to protect military voters than to challenge 
felon disenfranchisement provisions, military voting lawsuits succeed 
more often than felon disenfranchisement challenges.106 Litigation seeking 
to ensure that election officials dispatch absentee ballots to military voters 
on or before the forty-fifth day prior to the election—the deadline set by 
federal law—invariably succeeds.107 Sometimes, litigation seeks to enjoin 
 
 100. See also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 79–83; SMITH, supra note 72, at 47–
49. Congress achieved at least some voluntary compliance. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1385, at 2 (1968); 
S. REP. NO. 90-397, at 2 (1967). 
 101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973dd to 1973dd-5 (Supp. V 1975), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973dd 
to 1973dd-5 (Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1986). 
 102. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 83–85; SMITH, supra note 72, at 49. 
Although the statute applied to military voters stationed overseas, “[v]irtually all States [already] ha[d] 
statutes expressly allowing military personnel . . . to register and vote absentee from outside the 
country.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-649, pt. 1, at 3 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-121, at 3 (1975). 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973cc(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1986). 
 104. See 52 U.S.C. § 20301–11; see also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 86–87; 
SMITH, supra note 72, at 50. 
 105. See infra Section III.B.5. 
 106. See Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the MOVE Act in the 2010 Elections: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 36–37 (2011) (statement of Thomas E. Perez, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. for C.R.); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1973ff et seq., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 251 § 2 (2005). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 778 F.3d 1202, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. New York, No. 1:10-cv-1214 
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election officials from rejecting a service member’s ballot; these cases also 
usually succeed.108 Conversely, litigation to invalidate military ballots 
usually fails.109 One high-profile lawsuit, taking advantage of a  
complex history of legislative and administrative activity, succeeded in 
obtaining for all voters a special dispensation previously afforded to only 
military voters.110 
As one scholar put it, “difficulties persist for military and overseas 
voters.”111 Election professionals across the political spectrum agree that, 
while recent federal enactments have dramatically enhanced the voting 
experience for members of the armed forces, more work remains to protect 
servicemembers’ votes.112 Although the Uniform Law Commission 
proposed uniform state legislation to protect a state’s military voters, only 
a handful of jurisdictions have adopted some version of it.113 Even the 
adopting states do not always enact the proposed uniform legislation in its 
entirety.114 Despite several hearings,115 and even the passage by one 
 
(GLS/RFT), 2012 WL 254263, at *3–5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012). But see Doe v. Walker, 746 F. Supp. 
2d 667, 674 (D. Md. 2010). 
 108. See United States v. West Virginia, Civil Action No. 2:14-27456, 2014 WL 7338867, at *8 
(S.D.W.V. Dec. 22, 2014); Bush v. Hillsborough Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317–
18 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
 109. See Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (N.D. Fla.), 
aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Casarez v. Val Verde County, 16 F. Supp. 2d 727, 
732 (W.D. Tex. 1998); aff’d mem., 194 F.3d 1308 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 110. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012). For a detailed look at the 
complex circumstances in which this case arose, see Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial 
Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1879–87 (2013). 
 111. Steven F. Huefner, Lessons from Improvements in Military and Overseas Voting, 47 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 833, 878 (2013). 
 112. See, e.g., Examining the Voting Process—How States Can Build on the Recommendations 
From the Bauer-Ginsburg Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on 
H. Admin., 113th Cong. 148–49 (2014) (statement of Robert Bauer, Co-Chair, Pres. Comm’n on 
Election Admin.); id. at 149 (statement of Benjamin Ginsburg, Co-Chair, Pres. Comm’n on Election 
Admin.). 
 113. See UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT §§ 1–22 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2010). For the uniform legislation as enacted, see CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3101–23 (2020); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 1-8.3-101 to -119 (2020); D.C. CODE §§ 1-1061.01 to .20 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 15D-
1 to -18 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 117A.005 to .190 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.900 to 
.936 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-21-101 to -228 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 293D.101 to .540 
(2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-6B-1 to -17 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-258.1 to .25 (2020); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-07-18 to -33 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 14-136 to -155 (2020); 25 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 3501–19 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-15-600 to -760 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-
16-101 to -506 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-451 to -470 (2020). 
 114. See Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 844 n.75. 
 115. See Compilations of Hearings and Markups: Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. 
on Rules & Admin., 113th Cong. 123 (2015) (statement of Sen. Angus King); Military and Overseas 
Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Rep. 
Candice S. Miller, Chair, Comm. on H. Admin.); Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the 
MOVE Act in the 2010 Election: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 1 (2011) 
(statement of Rep. Daniel E. Lungren, Chair, Comm. on H,. Admin.) 
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chamber of two omnibus bills with updates to military voting law,116 
Congress has not enacted substantial military voting legislation in over a 
decade.117 Oversight agencies have determined that even the military’s 
own internal procedures need some degree of improvement.118 
Military voting has attracted little attention from legal scholars. 
Some of the literature takes a theoretical approach: one scholar considers 
the history of military enfranchisement and its ramifications for modern-
day voting restrictions;119 another argues that “UOCAVA created a voter 
qualification standard for federal elections, illustrating that the states’ 
authority [to set the qualifications of voters] under Article I, Section 2 
cannot be completely segregated from federal power.”120 Some scholars 
focus on more concrete policy proposals to improve servicemembers’ 
voting experience.121 Other scholarship explores the way in which military 
voting procedures impact election administration for all voters.122 One 
scholar conducted a case study on the role of military ballots in the 
Florida’s contested 2000 presidential election.123 The literature also 
 
 116. In 2019, the House of Representatives passed an omnibus election reform bill which, among 
other things, contained a host of updates to UOCAVA. See H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 1701–05 (as passed 
by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); H.R. REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 163–64 (2019); see also 165 CONG. REC. 
H2602 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2019) (recording a 234–193 vote for passage of H.R. 1). The Senate has 
precluded further action on the bill. See 165 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019) (statement 
of Sen. Mitch McConnell); see also S. DOC. 101-28, at 244 (1992). In 2017, the House passed a 
defense authorization bill which, among other things, included language providing that a 
servicemember does not gain or lose a domicile by virtue of registering to vote in a state where the 
servicemember is present by virtue of military orders. See H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. § 573 (as passed 
by the House, July 14, 2017); see also 163 CONG. REC. H5867–68 (July 14, 2017) (recording a 344–
81 vote for passage of H.R. 2810). The Senate amended the bill without including similar language, 
and the conference committee did not insist that the final bill contain the provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 
115-404, at 831 (2017). 
 117. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, secs. 575–89, 
§§ 101–05A, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318–35 (2009) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–11). 
Congress has enacted more recent military voting legislation, but these enactments contained only 
minor, technical, or clerical amendments. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, §§ 580C, 580D, 133 Stat. 1198, 1409 (2019); Ike Skelton National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, sec. 1075(d)(3)–(6), §§ 581–
89, 124 Stat. 4137, 4372–73 (2011). 
 118. See FARRELL, supra note 75, at 37; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
NO. DODIG-2019-065, EVALUATION OF DOD VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR 2018, at 13–14, 
17–20 (2019). 
 119. See Karlan, Ballots and Bullets, supra note 90, at 1346–62. 
 120. See Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over Elections, 99 B.U. L. 
REV. 317, 372 (2019). 
 121. See R. Michael Alvarez et al., Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological 
Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 990–96 (2007); Hall, supra note 
76, at 142; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 58–59. 
 122. See Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 880. 
 123. See Diane H. Mazur, The Bullying of America: A Cautionary Tale About Military Voting 
and Civil-Military Relations, 4 ELECTION L.J. 105, 105 (2005). 
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addresses the constitutionality of UOCAVA’s guarantee of voting rights 
to civilians indefinitely residing outside the United States.124  
No scholarship addresses the Nineteenth Amendment’s application to 
military voting. 
II. “ON ACCOUNT OF SEX”: WHY AND HOW THE NINETEENTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN 
As the above discussion illustrates, felon disenfranchisement and 
military service both pose severe yet unique barriers to the ballot. As the 
below discussion will illustrate, those barriers impact significantly more 
men than women. “The question then is what, if anything, can the 
Nineteenth Amendment do to help?”125 
Prior scholarship demonstrates how the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
Enforcement Clause conferred on Congress “extraordinary power to 
combat the voting restrictions that proliferate today” in light of the 
restrictions’ disproportionate impact on women.126 But the Nineteenth 
Amendment also endows Congress with similar authority to protect the 
voting rights of men. Given the manner in which felon disenfranchisement 
and military service impacts the voting rights of significantly more men 
than women, the Nineteenth Amendment’s congressional enforcement 
power enables Congress to tackle these obstacles. 
A. Why: The Gender-Neutral Nineteenth Amendment 
The Woman Suffrage Amendment concerns sex-based barriers to the 
ballot irrespective of whether those barriers harm men as opposed to 
women because the Nineteenth Amendment provides gender-neutral 
protection. Its operative clause contains a gender-neutral prohibition, 
barring restrictions on the franchise “on account of sex”127 without limiting 
its protection to women. One of the only things the Supreme Court has 
said about the Nineteenth Amendment is that it “applies to men and 
women alike.”128 
Other constitutional provisions are similarly neutral in their 
application. The Fourteenth Amendment, originally intended to protect 
 
 124. See Kalt, supra note 81, at 516; Gura, supra note 81, at 204. 
 125. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 529. 
 126. Id. at 551. 
 127. U.S. CONST. amend XIX, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 128. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937), overruled in part by Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (overruling only the Fourteenth Amendment holding). 
Multiple scholars have questioned Breedlove’s continuing viability. See Hasen & Litman, supra note 
4, at 35–38; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 539. Whatever other aspects of the decision warrant scrutiny, the 
literature generally does not criticize the decision’s endorsement of a constitutional protection that 
extends to both sexes. 
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black former slaves, nonetheless protects white voters.129 The Fifteenth 
Amendment, originally intended to protect black voters, nonetheless 
protects white voters.130 The Twenty-sixth Amendment, originally 
intended to protect young voters, nonetheless protects older voters.131 The 
Fifteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments contain language nearly 
identical to the Nineteenth Amendment, and if read in pari materia132 with 
one another, suggest that the Nineteenth Amendment applies in a gender-
neutral fashion.133 
Of course, the presumption that similar constitutional provisions 
should be interpreted to have similar meanings can be overcome.134 But no 
serious evidence exists to challenge the presumption that the Nineteenth 
Amendment shares the neutral application of its constitutional 
counterparts. Although the Sixty-sixth Congress that proposed the Woman 
Suffrage Amendment to the states originally intended the new 
constitutional provision to benefit women,135 nothing in the legislative 
history of the Nineteenth Amendment suggests that the drafters intended 
to deny men this new constitutional protection. The legislative record  
is similarly devoid of floor statements, committee reports, hearing 
testimony, or other legislative material that would otherwise cast doubt  
on the gender-neutral nature of the Nineteenth Amendment.  
Accordingly, the Nineteenth Amendment protects the voting rights of men 
as well as women. 
 
 129. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993); KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 71–72. 
 130. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 521–22 (2d Cir. 
1975), aff’d, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 74–83. Courts have acknowledged that 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation also protects non-Black voters. See League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436–42 (2006) (Latinx voters); DNC v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 
989, 1032 (9th Cir. 2020) (American Indian voters); United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 433–35 
(5th Cir. 2009) (white voters); Favors v. Cuomo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 356, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Asian 
American voters). 
 131. See KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 225–28; Fish, supra note 65, at 1222–24. 
 132. The “rule of in pari materia provides that legal texts should be interpreted in ways that 
preserve consistency among closely related laws and constitutional provisions dealing with the same 
subject matter.” David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2015). 
 133. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999); Jenny Diamond 
Cheng, Voting Rights for Millennials: Breathing New Life Into the Twenty-sixth Amendment, 67 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 653, 674–75 (2017); Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a 
Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1198 n.12 (2012). 
 134. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202; Cheng, supra note 133, at 
668, 673. 
 135. See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 139–78. 
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B. How: The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power136 
The Nineteenth Amendment does more than merely protect men’s 
voting rights: it also provides Congress with a robust authority to enforce 
those rights.137 The legislative history of the Nineteenth Amendment offers 
guidance on the appropriate use of that authority. 
1. Scope of the Enforcement Power 
When the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed the Nineteenth Amendment 
to the states for ratification, it engrafted onto the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment an Enforcement Clause that provided Congress with 
substantial, expansive authority to protect voting rights from sex-based 
barriers to the ballot as Congress, in its discretion, saw fit. This fact is 
confirmed by the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1138—the 
legislative vehicle for proposing the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
states—as well as other period legal sources that shed light on the intent 
of the Sixty-sixth Congress. 
That Congress recognized the extraordinary power the Enforcement 
Clause would confer on the legislative branch. Debate over House Joint 
Resolution 1 frequently discussed its enormous shift of power over 
elections from states to the federal government.139 Yet this shift did not 
bother Congress: the Senate rejected an amendment to weaken the 
Enforcement Clause by greater than a three-to-one margin.140 Both 
chambers took similar action when debating the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment in the Sixty-fifth Congress just a year earlier.141 Legal 
scholars of the era agreed that the Woman Suffrage Amendment endowed 
Congress with substantial enforcement power.142 
Strengthening this point is the legal environment of 1919: the Sixty-
sixth Congress adopted House Joint Resolution 1 against a constitutional 
 
 136. For a more complete survey of the scope of the Enforcement Clause, see Kolbert, supra 
note 1, at 543–59. 
 137. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 543–51. 
 138. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th. Cong. (1919). This legislative history includes material from prior 
Congresses considering a Woman Suffrage Amendment because the Sixty-sixth Congress explicitly 
relied on the vast record built by its legislative predecessors when considering House Joint Resolution 
1. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 534–38. 
 139. See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, pt. 2, at 1–3 (1919) (minority views); 58 CONG. REC. 563 (1919) 
(statement of Sen. William Borah); id. at 90 (statement of Rep. Frank Clark); id. at 81–82 (statement 
of Rep. Rufus Hardy). 
 140. See 58 CONG. REC. 634 (1919). 
 141. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,986–87 (1918) (Senate); id. at 810 (House). 
 142. See Emmet O’Neal, The Susan B. Anthony Amendment. Effect of Its Ratification on the 
Rights of the States to Regulate and Control Suffrage and Elections, 6 VA. L. REV. 338, 355 (1920); 
Charles Hall Davis, Note, Shall Virginia Ratify the Federal Suffrage Amendment?, 5 VA. L. REG. 354, 
363 (1919); Raeburn Green, Book Review, 30 HARV. L. REV. 406, 406–07 (1917) (reviewing HENRY 
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (1916)). 
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backdrop which included nearly identical Enforcement Clauses in the 
Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments.143 This identical language 
suggests the clauses should be read in pari materia with one another,144 
absent evidence to rebut this presumption. 
By 1919, a host of Fifteenth Amendment decisions construed that 
provision’s Enforcement Clause.145 Taken as a whole, the lessons of these 
Fifteenth Amendment decisions are two-fold. First, these decisions 
imposed limits on the Fifteenth Amendment’s congressional enforcement 
power: the Fifteenth Amendment “required some connection, some hook, 
into race- or color-based discrimination” to justify congressional action.146 
Second, the Court acknowledged that once Congress satisfied this race-or-
color prerequisite, the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress with 
significant authority to take the actions Congress deemed necessary to 
protect voting rights—without judicial interference.147 If the Sixty-sixth 
Congress intended to incorporate these Fifteenth Amendment decisions 
into the Nineteenth Amendment, this jurisprudence supports a powerful 
congressional enforcement authority with only minor limits. 
Eighteenth Amendment jurisprudence had yet to develop by 1919, 
but the Eighteenth Amendment informs the interpretation of the 
Nineteenth Amendment in other ways. When Congress proposes to the 
states a constitutional amendment with an enforcement clause, later 
legislative activity by members of the proposing Congress aids the 
understanding of the scope of that enforcement clause.148 In the case of the 
Sixty-sixth Congress, both proposed Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation and enacted Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
provide interpretive assistance and suggest a broad reading of the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. 
Following ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, members of 
the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed enforcement legislation which would 
exercise a significant level of authority—at the expense of states—over 
 
 143. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2; and id. amend XVIII, § 2, repealed by id. amend. 
XXI, § 1, with id. amend. XIX, para. 2. 
 144. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75; 
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12. 
 145. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664–
67 (1884); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542, 551–56 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217–22 (1875).  
 146. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 551. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33, 41 (2018); Franita Tolson, The 
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 422–25 (2014). 
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the election process.149 Although insufficient time remained to enact this 
proposed enforcement legislation before the expiration of the Sixty-sixth 
Congress,150 that same Congress did enact legislation pursuant to its 
Eighteenth Amendment enforcement power. The National Prohibition Act 
targeted a much larger swath of activity than the Eighteenth Amendment 
and created a sweeping regulatory regime, complete with a private right of 
action and criminal penalties—both to be enforced in federal court.151 The 
committee reports accompanying the legislation (1) outlined why this 
sweeping proposal constituted “appropriate legislation” despite the more 
narrow scope of the Eighteenth Amendment itself, (2) emphasized that the 
authority to determine the appropriateness of legislation rested with 
Congress (and not the courts), and (3) explained congressional 
expectations that a deferential judiciary would uphold any enforcement 
legislation reasonably related to the enforcement of Prohibition.152 A few 
years later, the Supreme Court agreed on largely the same grounds, 
upholding the National Prohibition Act and other similar legislation 
against a variety of constitutional challenges.153 
In short, the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation and enacted Eighteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation which both assumed a great deal of congressional authority. 
This proposed and enacted legislation, together with the legislative history 
of House Joint Resolution 1 and the backdrop of Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement jurisprudence, demonstrate the extraordinary power the 
Sixty-sixth Congress understood itself to possess under the Woman 
Suffrage Amendment. 
2. Appropriate Enforcement Targets 
The legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 demonstrates 
more than the scope of congressional power under the Enforcement 
 
 149. See S. 4739, 66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920); H.R. 15018, 66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920); S. 4323, 
66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920). Two scholars observe that this proposed legislation could be viewed as 
“consistent with a narrow conception of Congress’s enforcement power that allows Congress only to 
remedy constitutional violations,” because the legislation, despite its extensive reach into state election 
administration, generally tracked the language of the Nineteenth Amendment’s operative prohibition. 
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 152. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4–6 (1919); S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919). 
 153. See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387–88 (1920); see also Lambert v. Yellowley, 
272 U.S. 581, 593–97 (1926); James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–60 (1924); 
Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S. 466, 468–69 (1925); Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408–
09 (1922). 
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Clause; it also guides subsequent Congresses as to what types of voting 
restrictions Congress should target: those with a political impact, those that 
cut against full participation in society (especially participation in a war 
effort), and those that burden caretakers (especially caretakers of children) 
and the family.154 
First, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress may 
appropriately direct Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation at 
restrictions with a political or ideological impact. All elected policy 
makers care deeply about the legislative success of their policy vision. 
Likewise, politicians universally share an almost primal concern for their 
own electoral success and that of their allies. The Sixty-sixth Congress 
was no exception.155 In the debate over House Joint Resolution 1, members 
spoke often of the electoral impact of women voters in states with woman 
suffrage and the expected impact of women voters in the remaining 
states.156 Members made similar statements in the woman suffrage debates 
in the Sixty-fifth Congress.157 Committees in earlier Congresses heard 
testimony concerning the expected electoral impact of newly enfranchised 
women.158 Other testimony focused on how women’s political 
participation impacted public policy, as did a House committee report and 
floor debate.159 
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(testimony of Anne Martin, Chairman, Nat’l Woman’s Party); Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 
1 and S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 64th Cong. 66 (1916) (testimony of A.J. 
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Burton L. French). 
 159. See Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th 
Cong. 51 (1917) (testimony of Madeline Z. Doty, Correspondent of the New York Tribune); id. at 13 
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Res. 200 Before the H. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 327 (1918) (reprinting Seward A. 
1172 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1147 
Second, restrictions that burden a voter’s participation in society 
(especially participation in a war effort) also constitute appropriate targets 
for Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. Congressional 
concerns extended beyond mere partisan or political self-interest: the 
recently concluded “Great War” weighed heavily on members’ minds. 
During the war, President Woodrow Wilson appealed directly to Congress 
with a speech from the Senate floor, arguing that woman suffrage was 
necessary to the war effort.160 Committees of both chambers heard witness 
after witness testify to their support of woman suffrage in light of women’s 
contributions to the military campaign.161 Supporters of woman suffrage 
in both the Sixty-sixth Congress and its predecessors repeatedly praised 
women’s work in support of the military effort in World War I, citing that 
work as additional justification for the Woman Suffrage Amendment.162 
Members of Congress also recognized that women’s service in the war 
effort portended a larger role in society—a role members sought to 
protect.163 “Congress was proud of women’s new role in society—
especially, but not limited to, women’s role in the war effort—and sought 
to reward them with the franchise.”164 
Finally, Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation reflects the 
will of the Sixty-sixth Congress when that legislation takes aim at burdens 
on caretakers and their families. Members of Congress valued women’s 
roles as caretakers—especially caretakers of children—believing that their 
contributions to the institution of family warranted enfranchisement.165 
For years, congressional committees considering woman suffrage heard 
witnesses testify about the positive role women played as mothers and how 
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suffrage for women would improve their care of children.166 Reflecting on 
this testimony, committee reports on woman suffrage in both chambers 
reflected a concern for mothers and caretakers.167 Members made similar 
arguments in floor debate over woman suffrage.168 
In short, the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress centered on three 
points: (1) elections and public policy, (2) participation in society and the 
war effort, and (3) caregiving for children and family. Enforcement 
legislation therefore enjoys heightened legitimacy when targeting voting 
restrictions that touch on one or more of these concerns. 
III. NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION TO 
PROTECT THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN 
A. Legislation Concerning Felon Disenfranchisement 
Felon disenfranchisement represents one area for legitimate 
congressional action under the Nineteenth Amendment. Not only does the 
burden of felon disenfranchisement fall disproportionately on men,  
but felon disenfranchisement raises all three of the concerns the Sixty-
sixth Congress discussed when proposing the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment to the states. 
1. Burden on Men vs. Women 
First, states disqualify substantially more men than women from 
voting as a consequence of felony convictions. While the racially disparate 
impact of felony disenfranchisement receives the bulk of the attention,169 
the gender gap is likewise substantial: in 2000, states disenfranchised 
4,686,539 individuals with felony convictions, of which only 676,730 
(14%) were women; in 2004, the number rose to 5,266,207 
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disenfranchised individuals with felony convictions, of which 792,197 
(15%) were women.170 In other words, felon disenfranchisement bars 
substantially more men than women from the polls. 
2. Political Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement 
Second, felon disenfranchisement laws today have exactly the 
political effect with which the Sixty-sixth Congress concerned itself. 
Debate over felon disenfranchisement tends to break down along partisan 
lines.171 Social science evidence suggests the impact of felony 
disqualification rules may have a similar partisan slant. 
One widely-cited analysis estimates that permitting disqualified 
felons to vote would have reversed party control of the U.S. Senate 
between 1986 and 2002 by altering the result of up to seven U.S. Senate 
contests and would also have reversed the outcome of the hotly disputed 
2000 presidential election.172 Subsequent research suggests that limiting 
the re-enfranchised population to non-incarcerated felons, or even to non-
incarcerated felons no longer on probation or parole, creates a lesser but 
still pronounced impact on election results.173 
A more recent study found that between 1998 and 2012, “in states 
that replaced a full post-sentence ban with a partial ban, and thus allowed 
some ex-felons to vote,” candidates of one major political party “saw a 
statistically significant increase in general election vote share of 4.1 
percentage points, relative to” candidates of the opposing major party—an 
effect that “increase[d] to 6.49” percentage points “[w]hen district fixed 
effects [we]re added and the sample [wa]s restricted to 2002–2010.”174 The 
same study estimated that one major party would have gained additional 
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives at the expense of the opposing 
party in five of the eight election years between 2002–2010: a generous 
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model estimated changed results for between four and ten seats, enough to 
switch party control of the chamber for the 1998 and 2000 elections.175 
Some scholars believe the social science literature may overstate the 
political impact of felon voting.176 Nonetheless, supporters of felon 
disenfranchisement fear the prospect of voters with criminal convictions 
“dilut[ing] the vote of law-abiding citizens,” and raise the specter of 
“‘jailhouse blocs’ banding together to oust sheriffs and government 
officials who are tough on crime.”177 
Beyond election outcomes, the addition of disenfranchised felons to 
the voting population introduces different views into the political 
discourse. A poll conducted for a nonprofit journalism outfit found that 
incarcerated felons hold substantially different views than the population 
at large on a host of political issues, including assault weapons, marijuana 
legalization, the minimum wage, immigration, and (perhaps obviously) 
criminal justice reform.178 Interviews with prison inmates suggest that 
experience with the criminal justice system made them more likely to 
engage with public policy and the political process, but the loss of the right 
to vote dampened that enthusiasm.179 
The potential impact of disenfranchised felons on election outcomes 
and their contributions to political discourse parallels the impact and 
contributions expected from newly enfranchised women in 1919. For that 
reason, felon disenfranchisement hits squarely on the concern of the Sixty-
sixth Congress about the political and public policy impact of the 
disenfranchised population. 
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3. Reintegration into Society 
Third, the link between voting rights restoration and successful 
reintegration into society ties directly into one of the primary concerns of 
the Sixty-sixth Congress: the disenfranchised population’s full 
participation in society. Interviews with disenfranchised felons 
demonstrate that the loss of voting rights creates feelings of alienation and 
rejection from society, as well as anger at and distrust of government 
institutions.180 These feelings can impede successful reintegration into 
society.181 On the macro level, felon disenfranchisement contributes to an 
“inability to influence political processes [which] weakens leverage and 
access to important services that can moderate the risks of crime, from 
educational resources to trash removal and recreation.”182 
Even law enforcement stakeholders understand the burden that felon 
disenfranchisement imposes on an offender’s successful reintegration into 
society. The American Probation and Parole Association—a trade 
association for community corrections professionals—found that 
“disenfranchisement laws work against the successful reentry of 
offenders.”183 A former Philadelphia District Attorney later elected to the 
U.S. Senate spoke in favor of federal legislation to extend the franchise  
to felons, arguing that extending voting rights to offenders assists with 
their reintegration into society.184 The then-Attorney General of the  
United States described felon disenfranchisement as “counterproductive. 
By perpetuating the stigma and isolation imposed on formerly incarcerated 
individuals, these laws increase the likelihood they will commit  
future crimes.”185 
These comments are not empty rhetoric: “some evidence suggests a 
strong negative association between political participation and 
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recidivism.”186 For instance, the Florida Commission on Offender Review 
(FCOR) reported that of the 879 offenders granted restoration of their civil 
rights in 2017 and 2018, only one reoffended with a new felony 
conviction.187 The social science literature suggests that FCOR’s report is 
no anomaly. Existing scholarship demonstrates “a robust negative 
correlation between voting and subsequent recidivism, suggesting that the 
prosocial nature of voting may contribute to the civic reintegration of 
current and former felons.”188 
One study analyzed the data from the Youth Development Study, a 
long-term survey that followed former St. Paul, Minnesota public school 
students from ninth grade in 1988 into adulthood in 2000.189 The study’s 
analysis determined that 16% of non-voters but only 5% of voters were 
arrested between 1997 and 2000.190 Among individuals with prior arrest 
records, 27% of the non-voters but only 12% of the voters were arrested 
again between 1997 and 2000.191 The result held when considering self-
reported criminal behavior: 11% of voters but 18% of non-voters reported 
committing a property crime, while 27% of voters but 42% of non-voters 
reported committing a violent crime.192 The study’s authors concluded 
“that a relationship between voting and subsequent crime and arrest is not 
only plausible, but also supported by empirical evidence.”193 
A second study analyzed data from a U.S. Department of Justice 
survey of 272,111 prisoners across fifteen states released from 
incarceration in 1994, representing two-thirds of all prisoners released in 
the United States that year.194 The study found that “individuals who are 
released in states that permanently disenfranchise are roughly [19%] more 
likely to be rearrested than those released in states that restore the franchise 
post-release,” suggesting that “disenfranchisement is directly related to 
recidivism.”195 The study’s authors noted that although the “effect of 
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permanent disenfranchisement policy on recidivism was slightly 
diminished” after considering a released prisoner’s “race, gender, criminal 
history, and the state unemployment rate,” state disenfranchisement rules 
“remained a significant predictor [of recidivism] nonetheless.”196  
The study concluded that “states which permanently disenfranchise  
ex-felons experience significantly higher repeat offense rates than states 
that do not.”197 
A third study matched voting records and criminal records of 
individuals on probation or parole in Oregon, which permits these 
supervised populations to vote.198 This study found lower recidivism rates 
among probationers who vote (5.9%) than those who do not (7.8%).199 The 
difference in recidivism rates widened among parolees: parolees who vote 
(19.3%) reoffended at a much lower rate than parolees who did not 
(26.1%).200 The study noted that the recidivism difference may be even 
greater in states with in-person voting at polling places than in states like 
Oregon which conduct elections entirely by mail.201 
All of this is to say that ample evidence demonstrates the correlation 
between the restoration of felon voting rights and the successful re-entry 
of felons into society. Even supporters of felon disenfranchisement agree 
that “[r]eintegration of felons into the community is an important goal, 
and . . . restoration of voting rights can be a part of that process.”202  
Felon disenfranchisement, then, hits directly on point with the concern  
of the Sixty-sixth Congress about disenfranchised voters’ full participation 
in society. 
4. Felons, Fatherhood, and the Family 
Finally, because many disenfranchised felons are also fathers, felon 
disenfranchisement impacts voters who serve as caregivers of their 
families, aligning directly with the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress. 
In 2007, the country’s 1,518,535 state and federal prisoners included an 
estimated 809,500 parents (53.3%) of approximately 1,706,600 children 
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under age 18 (2.3% of all such children in the United States).203 These 
prisoner-parents included an estimated 744,200 fathers (91.9%) compared 
to an estimated 65,600 mothers (8.8%).204 These numbers increase when 
adding the jail population to the prison population: the nation’s 2.3 million 
prisoners and jail inmates include 1.2 million parents—120,000 mothers 
and 1.1 million fathers—of 2.7 million children under age 18.205 
Just over half of the prisoner-parents—52% of mothers and 54% of 
fathers—provided the primary financial support for their minor children 
before entering prison.206 Over 78% of prisoner-parents reported keeping 
in contact with their children during the period of incarceration.207 While 
not every person convicted of a felony receives a sentence of 
incarceration,208 these statistics concerning fatherhood among incarcerated 
felons nonetheless suggest that felon disenfranchisement touches on the 
concern of the Sixty-sixth Congress about caregivers and the family. 
5. Potential Legislative Remedies 
Not only does felon disenfranchisement disproportionately burden 
the voting rights of men, but it directly touches on the all three concerns 
the Sixty-sixth Congress expressed when proposing the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment to the states. Accordingly, the Nineteenth Amendment 
empowers Congress to protect voting rights against state action to 
disqualify felons from voting. Given the broad enforcement power granted 
to Congress under the Nineteenth Amendment, Congress may 
constitutionally choose from a wide array of policy options to combat 
felon disenfranchisement. 
The most commonly discussed option is direct modification or 
elimination of state felon disenfranchisement provisions. However, 
proposals vary about which classes of felons to enfranchise. Some propose 
letting all felons vote, even those currently incarcerated.209 Other 
proposals would bar the disenfranchisement of most felons but exempt 
 
 203. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 222984, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 2 tbl.2, 13 app. tbl.1 
(rev. 2010). 
 204. See id. at 2. 
 205. See ECON. MOBILITY PROJ. & PUB. SAFETY PERF. PROJ., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., 
COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 18 (2010). 
 206. See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 203, at 5. 
 207. See id. at 6 tbl.10. 
 208.  n 2006, 69% of state felony convictions and 86% of federal felony convictions resulted in 
a sentence of either jail or prison. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., NO. NCJ 226846, BUREAU OF 
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TABLES 9 tbl.1.6 (rev. 2010). 
 209. See, e.g., April McCullum, Sanders Would Let Felons Vote in Prison, BURLINGTON FREE 
PRESS, Apr. 25, 2019, at 10A. 
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either current inmates or anyone still serving a criminal sentence 
(including probationers and parolees).210 Some proposals would condition 
the restoration of voting rights on the type of crime.211 Still others would 
restore a felon’s voting rights only after an individualized review of that 
particular’s felon’s circumstances.212 
Congress could also provide for lesser remedies. For instance, 
Congress might prohibit states from conditioning the restoration of a 
felon’s voting rights on the payment of the financial obligations associated 
with the felony conviction, such as fines and court costs.213 Congress might 
also require state courts, before accepting a plea or proceeding to trial, to 
instruct defendants about a conviction’s impact upon the defendant’s 
voting rights.214 
Alternatively (or additionally), Congress might require states to 
designate probation and parole offices and corrections institutions as voter 
registration agencies under the National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA).215 Following the NVRA’s statutory scheme, Congress might also 
require state probation, parole, and corrections officers to assist their 
supervised or incarcerated population with determinations of voting 
eligibility and (for those eligible to vote) with voter registration.216 
Congress might also impose similar requirements on federal criminal 
justice agencies. 
Congress need not limit itself to these ideas. Whatever approach 
Congress takes,217 the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
authorizes congressional action to address felon disenfranchisement. 
 
 210. Compare H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1402 (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019), with 148 
CONG. REC. 1490 (2002). 
 211. See, e.g., Adv. Op. re: Voting Restor’n Amend., 215 So. 3d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 2017). 
 212. See, e.g., von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1392. 
 213. For a taxonomy of the varying types of legal financial obligations that individuals can incur 
as a result of a criminal conviction, see Cammett, supra note 59, at 378–81. 
 214. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). 
 215. See 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(2) (2018). The NVRA requires that a government office 
designated as a voter registration agency, in addition to its normal duties, also assist visitors to the 
office with voter registration and transmit completed voter registration applications to appropriate state 
election officials. See id. § 20506(a)(4)(A), (6). 
 216. See id. § 20506(a)(4)(A), (6). There is evidence that efforts to inform eligible felons of their 
right to vote increases the likelihood that this population will register and vote. See Alan S. Gerber et 
al., Can Incarcerated Felons Be (Re)Integrated into the Political System? Results from a Field 
Experiment, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912, 924–25 (2015). 
 217. This Article takes no position on the merits of any of these proposals. Given the breadth of 
policy ideas—consider the wide between, for instance, requiring states to permit prison inmates to 
vote and requiring state probation officers merely to discuss voting with probationers—policy 
questions lie beyond this Article’s scope. This Article seeks only to establish the bounds of 
congressional authority, not to attempt a normative defense of any particular idea. 
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B. Legislation to Protect Military Voters 
In addition to felon disenfranchisement, military voting represents 
another area for legitimate congressional action under the Nineteenth 
Amendment. As discussed above, military service creates legal and 
logistical challenges for servicemembers registering to vote, receiving and 
returning ballots, and having those ballots counted. These challenges fall 
disproportionately on men, given the gender breakdown of the military 
population. Military service also touches on all three of the concerns that 
the Sixty-sixth Congress discussed when proposing the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment to the states, making military voters prime subjects for 
Nineteenth Amendment protection. 
1. Burden on Men vs. Women 
First, the barriers to voting faced by the country’s servicemembers 
fall primarily on men. Women constitute only 17.1% of the nation’s active 
duty military personnel.218 Women make up a small minority of both 
officers (18.5% female) and enlisted personnel (16.7% female).219 Each 
military service—the Army (15.4% female), Navy (20.1% female), Air 
Force (21.0% female), and Marines (9.0% female)—features a similar 
gender disparity.220 The nation’s armed forces—and therefore, the nation’s 
military voters—are overwhelmingly male, causing the burdens of 
military service to fall disproportionately on male voters. 
2. Political Impact of Military Voters 
Second, servicemembers play precisely the type of political and 
electoral role the Sixty-sixth Congress saw as desirable. While a military 
tradition of political neutrality inhibited voting among the officer corps in 
the first half of the Twentieth Century, “the American armed forces have 
become steadily more politically involved since World War II.”221 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that military personnel overall tend to lean 
more in one ideological direction than the other and tend to identify with 
the corresponding major political party rather than the opposing party.222 
 
 218. See DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TABLE OF ACTIVE DUTY 
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 219. See id. 
 220. See id.; DMDC, TOTAL MIL. PERS. JAN. 2020, supra note 66, at 1. 
 221. Paul P. Van Riper & Darab B. Unwalla, Voting Patterns of Military Officers, 80 POL. SCI. 
Q. 48, 61 (1965). 
 222. See THOMAS E. HICKS, MAKING THE CORPS 279–83 (1st Touchstone ed. 1998); Russell A. 
Burgos, An N of 1: A Political Scientist in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 551, 553–54 
(2004); Ole R. Holsti, Politicization of the United States Military: Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot?, 57 
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Empirical support exists for this thesis.223 For instance, surveys 
between 1976 and 1996 of both military personnel studying at the National 
War College and senior uniformed Pentagon officers support both the 
political ideology and party affiliation hypotheses.224 Multiple scholars 
have analyzed a 1998–1999 survey of military leadership as well as 
officers and officer candidates situated to enter leadership, largely 
confirming the findings of the earlier study.225 A 2004 survey of both 
enlisted Army personnel and Army officers found similar results for the 
Army overall—with more pronounced results for officers than for enlisted 
personnel.226 A 2008–2009 survey of both enlisted personnel and officers 
across all service branches corroborated these findings, including the more 
pronounced results among officers than among enlisted personnel.227 The 
findings of a 2009 survey of Army officers between the ranks of second 
lieutenant and colonel match the findings of earlier studies.228 A 2015–
2016 survey of military officers attending the National Defense University 
and cadets attending U.S. Military Academy at West Point shows similar 
results.229 This tendency towards one end of the ideological spectrum and 
one of the two major political parties extends to the highest ranks of 
military leadership.230 One scholar posits that the nature of military service 
makes servicemembers more likely to identify with one of the major 
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note 223, at 145–46. 
 226. See JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 75 tbl.5.3, 102 tbl.6.2 (2010). 
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Two Long Wars, 57 ORBIS 351, 357 tbl.1, 358 tbl.2 (2013). 
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political parties in light of the shared values between that party  
and the military.231 
These ideology and party affiliation trends hold even after returning 
to the civilian world: data show that veterans identify with the same 
political party and tend to lean toward the same end of the ideological 
spectrum as active duty servicemembers.232 This matters for electoral 
outcomes because research shows that prior military service is correlated 
with an increased likelihood of voting.233 
Government data shows that servicemembers would vote if not for 
the obstacles presented by military service. For the 2018 midterm election, 
data from the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the federal 
agency responsible for military voting, show that between 61% and 67% 
of active duty military personnel were registered to vote and between 26% 
and 31% cast a ballot.234 For the most recent presidential election in 2016, 
FVAP data show that 68% of active duty military personnel were 
registered to vote and 46% cast a ballot.235 These numbers are particularly 
noteworthy in the context of the substantial barriers to registration and 
voting servicemembers face as a consequence of their military service. 
The political impact of the military reaches beyond the votes of 
servicemembers. One scholar describes the military as “a recognizable 
interest group” which “is larger, more bureaucratically active, more 
political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than 
anything similar in American history.”236 A 2009 study of Army officers 
found that officers engage in a host of political activity beyond casting 
ballots: the vast majority discussed their political beliefs and opinions with 
others or encouraged other military personnel to vote, while a substantial 
minority donated money to a political campaign.237 The pervasive political 
activity of high-level military leaders has spawned an entire taxonomy of 
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political tactics—some public, others private—that military brass use to 
influence public policy.238 Commentators defend this political activity as 
necessary to further the military’s ability to defend the nation’s interests, 
even suggesting “advanced specialized training and assignments to billets 
where military members can gain experience in political settings and the 
opportunity to practice political skills.”239 
To be sure, U.S. Department of Defense policy prohibits partisan 
political activity by active duty servicemembers.240 Commentators 
generally agree that military personnel should eschew direct, public 
involvement in partisan politics to help protect the armed forces from 
becoming politicized.241 To that end, senior military leadership frequently 
remind servicemembers about their obligation to remain apolitical.242 
However, neither scholars nor senior military leadership consider 
registering to vote and casting a ballot to raise the types of military 
professionalism and politicization concerns that attend other forms of 
political activity.243 For that reason, military policy expressly permits 
servicemembers to register and vote.244 These votes, along with 
servicemembers’ other political activity, ensure military voters play 
exactly the political and electoral role the Sixty-sixth Congress envisioned 
when it proposed the Woman Suffrage Amendment to the states. 
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3. War Effort 
Third—and almost too obvious to point out—the burdens of military 
service lie squarely within the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress about 
enfranchising those who help with a war effort. Military voters face 
challenges precisely because the demands of defending the nation often 
align poorly with the needs of efficient election administration.245 
Prior scholarship has noted that “using the Twenty-sixth Amendment 
to protect the voting rights of soldiers is particularly appropriate given that 
one of the central purposes of the Amendment was to halt the 
disenfranchisement of young Americans fighting overseas in Vietnam.”246 
Similarly, using the Nineteenth Amendment to protect military voters is 
particularly appropriate when one of the core objectives of the Woman 
Suffrage Amendment was to enfranchise women whose service in World 
War I Congress deemed essential to victory.247 
4. Dads on Deployment and Fatherhood in the Field: Military Families 
Finally, military fatherhood touches on the concern of the Sixty-sixth 
Congress regarding caregivers and the family. Military records from 2018 
show that 486,495 (37.3%) of the country’s active duty military 
servicemembers had dependent children.248 These records may understate 
parenthood among those in the military ecosystem: when a nonprofit 
military family support organization surveyed military families in 2017, 
85% of respondents reported having children or stepchildren.249 Whatever 
the correct figure, military men are more likely to be parents than their 
female counterparts.250 Importantly, servicemembers are more likely than 
civilians to have children.251 
Of course, servicemembers care for more than just children: military 
records from 2018 reveal that 681,570 (52.3%) of active duty 
servicemembers care for a spouse or other dependent.252 In fact, those 2018 
records reveal that military family members (1,596,169), including 
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spouses, children, and adult dependents, actually outnumber active duty 
servicemembers (1,304,418).253 Given the totality of this evidence, 
military voters fit within the scope of the concern the Sixty-sixth Congress 
demonstrated for caregivers of children and the family. 
5. Potential and Existing Legislative Remedies 
Because of the disproportionate burden military service imposes on 
men and the way military service touches on the three concerns the Sixty-
sixth Congress expressed when proposing the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment to the states, the Nineteenth Amendment empowers Congress 
to protect voting rights against the burdens of military service. Considering 
the broad enforcement power granted to Congress under the Nineteenth 
Amendment, Congress can constitutionally choose from a variety of 
policy options to protect military voters. 
Existing law—including UOCAVA and the Servicemembers Civil 
Relief Act (SCRA)—provides servicemembers with a host of broad-based 
legal protections to combat the practical barriers they face when 
registering to vote and casting a ballot in federal elections.254 The SCRA 
contains only one voting-related provision, stating that a servicemember’s 
legal residence or domicile “[f]or the purposes of voting for any Federal 
office . . . or a State or local office” does not change as a result of military-
related absences from the servicemember’s home state.255 UOCAVA 
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contains a similar provision, requiring states to permit otherwise-qualified 
servicemembers to vote in federal elections notwithstanding their service-
related absence from their voting residence.256 By incorporating state law 
concerning voting domicile and residency and limiting its application to 
federal elections, UOCAVA does not sweep as broadly as the SCRA, 
which both overrides state voting domicile law and extends its application 
to both federal and non-federal elections. 
UOCAVA contains a host of other safeguards for military voters. For 
instance, the statute requires states to offer both absentee registration and 
balloting to facilitate the electoral participation of eligible military 
voters.257 If a state rejects a servicemember’s voter registration application 
or absentee ballot request, the state must explain its reasons for the 
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rejection.258 To help ensure military voters receive their ballots in time to 
vote, states must (with limited exceptions) send blank ballots to military 
voters at least forty-five days prior to each election.259 At a military voter’s 
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legislation, the sponsor of the earlier military voting bill introduced an amendment that would require 
states to explain their reasons for rejecting a servicemember’s voter registration application or absentee 
ballot request. See 148 CONG. REC. 4225–26 (2002). However, the amendment did not include the 
language from the original military voting bills requiring a similar explanation for rejecting a 
servicemember’s voted ballot. See id. The Senate adopted the amendment without discussion. See id. 
at 4226. The language became law with the enactment of the omnibus elections bill. See Help America 
Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec. 707, § 102, 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002). 
 259. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (2018). The requirement for forty-five days of ballot transit 
time traces its roots to 1944 military voting legislation, in which Congress “recommended that, in 
States where the voters’ absentee ballot will not be available for mailing to the voter forty-five days 
prior to any primary, general, or special election, such States cause to be made such changes in the 
election laws of their States as will lengthen the time.” 50 U.S.C. § 327(d) (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 
1955). Over six decades later, nearly half the states failed to comply with this recommendation. See 
SUSAN URAHN, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, NO TIME TO VOTE: CHALLENGES FACING AMERICA’S 
OVERSEAS MILITARY VOTERS 28 (2009). At congressional hearings in both chambers, a broad cross-
section of stakeholders testified concerning both delays in postal delivery and the need for states to 
transmit ballots to military voters with enough time for the unmarked ballot to reach the 
servicemember and return to election officials before the state counting deadline. See Hearings and 
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 350, 356, 360, 361, 366–67, 367, 371, 
468, 471, 495–96, 508, 526–27, 555–562, 568–69, 586–91, 614, 616, 619 (2009); Hearing on Military 
and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections 
of the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 6–7, 28, 40, 47, 69–70, 82, 100–01, 126–33, 139–40, 172–
75, 190, 204 (2009). In response to this testimony, Congress considered legislation to require states to 
send ballots earlier. The first draft of the legislation required states to transmit blank ballots at least 
forty-five days before election day and required states to count ballots received within fifty-five days 
after transmission (in other words, ten days after election day). See S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 5 (as 
introduced, July 8, 2009). A committee amendment removed the fifty-five day requirement in light of 
the consensus at the hearing that forty-five days was sufficient ballot transit time. See S. 1415, 111th 
Cong. § 6 (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009); see also Hearings and 
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 644, 648–49 (2009). The committee 
favorably reported the bill as amended. See id. at 645. The chief sponsor announced he would propose 
the text of the reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See id. at 639. 
With only technical changes, the sponsor’s amendment largely tracked the language in the reported 
bill imposing a forty-five day deadline for ballot transmission. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,801 (2009). 
Debate over the amendment on the Senate floor reiterated the need for adequate ballot transit time in 
light of the postal delays servicemembers routinely faced. See, e.g., id. at 18,891 (statement of Sen. 
Chuck Schumer). The Senate adopted the amendment and passed the underlying defense authorization 
bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. The conference committee on the defense authorization bill kept the 
provision for a forty-five day ballot transmission deadline but adopted a technical amendment. See 
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request, states must use electronic means (rather than the postal system) to 
transmit to the servicemember a voter registration application, an 
application for an absentee ballot, and even the blank, unmarked ballot 
itself.260 States must develop a system for servicemembers to track 
whether the servicemember’s local election official has received the 
servicemember’s voted ballot.261 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, at 744 (2009). The provision became law along with the rest of the military 
voting language attached to the defense authorization bill. See Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 579(a)(1), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2322 (2009). 
 260. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(6)–(7), (e)(1), (f)(1)(A) (2018). Congress enacted these 
provisions after hearing testimony that electronic transmission of election documents could reduce 
delays and other difficulties related to registering to vote and casting a ballot. See Hearings and 
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 353, 355–56, 361–62, 368, 369, 371, 
376, 457, 468, 484–86, 492, 529–30, 560–61, 565–68, 598–99, 616–17, 619 (2009); Hearing on 
Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 6, 27–28, 40, 45–46, 58–60, 66, 103–04, 131–
32, 136–39, 157, 167, 181, 193–94, 197, 204 (2009). Omnibus military voting legislation introduced 
in the Senate required states to use e-mail, fax, or other electronic means to transmit voter registration 
applications, absentee ballot applications, as well as blank, unmarked ballots, if requested by a 
servicemember. See S. 1415, 111th Cong. §§ 3–4 (as introduced, July 8, 2009). An amendment in 
committee changed references from “email” and “facsimile” transmission to a more general 
“electronic” transmission to avoid requiring the use of these technologies if they later became obsolete. 
See S. 1415, 111th Cong. §§ 4–5 (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009); see 
also Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 644, 649 (2009). 
The committee reported the bill favorably. See id. at 645. The chief sponsor announced he would 
propose the text of the reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See 
id. at 639. With minor changes, the sponsor’s amendment largely tracked the language in the reported 
bill requiring electronic transmission of election materials. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,800–01 (2009). 
During floor debate over the amendment, senators expressed their belief that digital transmission of 
election materials would speed up the voting process and help overcome the delays associated with 
traditional mail. See, e.g., id. at 18,993 (statement of Sen. Ben Nelson). The Senate adopted the 
amendment and passed the underlying defense authorization bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. A 
conference committee on the defense authorization bill kept the electronic transmission provisions but 
adopted technical amendments. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, at 743–44 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). The 
provisions became law along with the rest of the military voting language attached to the defense 
authorization bill. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, secs. 
577(a), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2319–20 (2009); id. sec. 578(a), § 102, 123 Stat. at 2321. 
 261. 52 U.S.C. § 20302(h) (2018). Congress enacted this provision after hearing testimony that 
military voters often wondered whether their voted ballots had reached election officials, given the 
uncertainties of the military postal system. Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & 
Admin., 111th Cong. 362–63, 364–65, 454, 475–76, 526–31, 593, 609–10 (2009); Hearing on Military 
and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections 
of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 34, 41–42, 100–05, 176–77, 197 (2009). In response to 
this testimony, members of Congress introduced multiple bills creating a ballot tracking system. The 
bills differed in their approach: two would have applied only to overseas servicemembers and made 
the federal government responsible for creating and administering the system, while one would have 
imposed this responsibility on the states and applied regardless of a servicemember’s location. 
Compare S. 1026, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2019), and H.R. 2393, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (as reported by 
Comm. on H. Admin., Oct. 1, 2009), with S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 7(d) (as reported by S. Comm. on 
Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009). The Senate attached the latter language to a defense authorization 
bill for the upcoming fiscal year. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,802 (2009); id. at 18,993. The provision 
1190 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1147 
UOCAVA also establishes two federal forms—the Federal Post Card 
Application (FPCA) and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB)—
that military voters can use in order to register and vote.262 A single form 
with two functions, the FPCA entitles a servicemember to both register to 
vote and request an absentee ballot, irrespective of whether a state requires 
other forms for these purposes.263 States may not refuse to process these 
forms for being submitted too early under state law and must process these 
forms if election officials receive them at least thirty days in advance of 
an election, irrespective of any state deadline.264 For military personnel 
 
became law following enactment of the bill. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-84, sec. 580(d), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2325 (2009). 
 262. See Federal Post Card Application, Std. Form No. 76, OMB No. 0704-0503 (Fed. Voting 
Ass’t Prgm. Apr. 2019); Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, Std. Form No. 186, OMB No. 0704-0502 
(Fed. Voting Ass’t Prgm. Apr. 2019). 
 263. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(4) (2018). Congress created the FPCA in the 1942 military voting 
legislation. See 50 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1955). This legislation required states to 
send ballots to servicemembers who completed and returned an FPCA. See id. § 307. Follow-up 
legislation two years later repealed the mandate and merely recommended that states accept the FPCA 
as both a request for an absentee ballot and a voter registration application. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 322, 324 
(Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 1955). By 2001, all states voluntarily accepted the FPCA. See Federal 
Election Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 113 (2001) (testimony of Samuel F. Wright, Co-Chair, Uniformed Services Voting Rights 
Committee, Reserve Officers Association). Bills in both chambers of Congress would have cemented 
the status quo by requiring states to accept the FPCA for both voter registration and absentee ballot 
requests. See, e.g., S. 1261, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C) (2001); H.R. 1997, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C) 
(2001). Although neither bill received a hearing, a Senate committee later suggested a similar proposal. 
See S. REP. NO. 107-62, at 306 (2001). The committee reported a defense authorization bill which 
included language mandating use of the FPCA. See S. 1416, 107th Cong. § 575 (as reported by S. 
Comm. on Armed Servs., Sept. 12, 2001). The conference committee on the defense authorization bill 
combined this language with a related provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-333, at 734–35 (2001) (Conf. 
Rep.). The FPCA mandate became law along with the rest of the defense authorization bill. See 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, sec. 1606, § 102, 115 
Stat. 1012, 1278 (2001) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(4) (2018)). 
 264. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(2), 20306 (2018). Although related, the two provisions date 
from different eras. The thirty-day deadline for processing is a holdover from the 1975 overseas voting 
legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd-2(a) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1986). The early submission 
provision dates from 2001, when members of Congress in both chambers had introduced legislation 
with this language. See S. 731, 107th Cong. § 5(a) (2001); H.R. 1377, 107th Cong. § 5(a) (2001). 
Neither bill received a committee hearing, but the bills’ language appeared the next year in an 
amendment during Senate debate over an omnibus election reform bill. See 148 CONG. REC. 1209 
(2002). A co-sponsor of the amendment stated that servicemembers needed to be able to submit early 
requests for absentee ballots given the “rapid deployments, temporary duties, and unexpected 
assignment changes” inherent in military service. Id. at 1210 (statement of Sen. Wayne Allard). 
Another co-sponsor considered the amendment necessary for servicemembers who “are out on some 
bivouac for a week someplace or are out in a combat zone somewhere for a month and don’t get back” 
in time to vote. Id. at 1211 (statement of Sen. Bob Smith). A third co-sponsor observed that “[w]ith 
mail delays, remote deployments and other very real circumstances, it can take literally months [for 
servicemembers] to complete the multi-step process” of registering to vote and casting a ballot, 
requiring legislative assistance to enable servicemembers “to plan ahead, especially when they are 
going to be deployed during an election.” Id. at 1212 (statement of Sen. Dick Lugar). The Senate 
adopted the amendment without a recorded vote. See id. at 1213. The language eventually became law 
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who timely request an absentee ballot but do not receive that ballot in time 
to vote, these voters may cast a ballot on the FWAB even if a state requires 
votes to be cast on the state’s own official ballot.265 While states may 
 
following enactment of the underlying omnibus election reform legislation. See Help America Vote 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec. 706(a), § 104, 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002) (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 20306 (2018)). 
 265. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(3), 20303 (2018). The FWAB traces its roots to the federal “war 
ballot” created by the 1944 military voting legislation. See 50 U.S.C. § 333 (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 
1946). That legislation permitted servicemembers to vote on a “war ballot” printed and distributed by 
the federal government, but only if permitted by state law and then only under certain additional 
conditions (which varied based on whether a servicemember was stationed domestically or overseas). 
See id. § 332(b). No state law authorized use of the war ballot for domestic servicemembers, and fewer 
than half the states authorized its use for servicemembers stationed overseas. See ROBERT P. 
PATTERSON ET AL., U.S. WAR BALLOT COMM’N, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES WAR BALLOT 
COMMISSION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ¶ 26(c)(3) (1945), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 
79-6, at 12 (1945). Congress repealed the provisions for war ballots in 1946 in part because of the war 
ballot’s limited adoption. See DAVID ET AL., supra note 95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 20 
(1952). Four decades later, Congress enacted the FWAB provision in response to testimony from 
servicemember organizations, election administrators, and the director of the Federal Voting 
Assistance Program that servicemembers often did not receive ballots in time to return them by the 
relevant state deadline because of delays in the absentee voting process outside the servicemember’s 
control. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-765, at 10–13 (1986); see also Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on H. Admin., 99th Cong. 
13–14, 29, 39, 45, 79, 89, 104, 110 (1986). During floor debate over the bill, members of Congress 
commented that the FWAB was necessary in light of the unreliability of foreign postal systems: “for 
those Americans overseas—particularly the men and women serving the Nation in the Armed 
Forces—it has been, at times, not a right but a matter of luck to get one’s ballot back in time to be 
counted,” because “[i]n many foreign countries, an absentee ballot is just as likely to disappear forever 
as it is to get to the polling place on time.” 132 CONG. REC. 21,894 (1986) (statement of Sen. Wendell 
Ford); see also id. at 20,976 (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio). Other debate on the bill noted that 
many states sent out ballots too late, leaving too little time for servicemembers to receive the ballot, 
vote, and return the ballot by the relevant state deadline. See id. at 20,976 (statement of Rep. Al Swift). 
The FWAB provision became law with the enactment of the overhaul of military and overseas civilian 
voting legislation. See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410 
§ 103, 100 Stat. 924, 925–26 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20303). Congress initially 
limited use of the FWAB to overseas voters (irrespective of military status) and general elections. See 
id. § 103, 100 Stat. at 925–26. In 2004, a Senate committee proposed allowing domestic 
servicemembers to use the FWAB because “[o]perational considerations and the mobility of military 
personnel often make it difficult for them to specify accurately the mailing address they will be using 
in the period immediately prior to a general election,” and “[c]hanges in deployment schedules or 
receipt of orders with short notice may prevent [servicemembers] from receiving state-provided 
absentee ballots in the mail in time for the election.” S. REP. NO. 108-260, at 334 (2004). The 
committee reported a defense authorization bill to the Senate which included a provision expanding 
FWAB use to domestic servicemembers. See S. 2400, 108th Cong. § 572(b)(2) (as reported by S. 
Comm. on Armed Servs., May 11, 2004). The conference committee on the defense authorization bill 
kept the provision with a technical amendment. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-767, at 679–80 (2004) (Conf. 
Rep.). The provision became law with the rest of the bill. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, sec. 566(c)(2), § 103, 118 Stat. 1811, 
1919 (2004) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20303 (2018)). In 2009, Congress followed up with omnibus 
military voting legislation which included a provision requiring states to honor the FWAB in special, 
primary, and runoff elections in addition to general elections. See Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 581(a)(1), § 103, 123 Stat. 2190, 2326 (2009) (codified 
at 52 U.S.C. § 20303 (2018)). 
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require an oath or affirmation from military voters as part of the 
registration and voting process, UOCAVA obligates states to accept the 
oath drafted by the federal agency charged with overseeing military 
voting.266 UOCAVA also prohibits states from requiring notarization of 
voter registration applications, applications for an absentee ballot, or 
FWABs.267 
 
 266. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(5) (2018). This provision traces its roots to the 1942 military 
voting legislation, which prescribed language for oaths to be included on both the FPCA and the war 
ballot; the legislation obligated states to accept this oath as sufficient. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 303, 306(a) 
(Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1944). Follow-up legislation also proscribed oath language, but Congress no 
longer required that states accept it. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 327(c) (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 1946). In 
2001, two bills contained language creating a standard oath for use with military voting materials and 
requiring states to accept that oath as sufficient to satisfy any oath or affirmation requirement in state 
law. See S. 1261, 107th Cong. § 6(b)(2)(C) (2001); H.R. 1997, 107th Cong. § 6(b)(2)(C) (2001). 
Neither bill received a hearing, but a House committee reported omnibus election reform legislation 
containing similar language. See H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. § 605(b)(2)(C) (as reported by Comm. on 
H. Admin., Dec. 10, 2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-329, pt. 1, at 52–53 (2001). The Senate replaced the 
mandatory provision with language requiring a federal agency to study the issue. See H.R. 3295, 107th 
Cong. § 409(a)(2) (as passed by the Senate, Apr. 11, 2002). The language calling for a study originated 
as an amendment during debate on the Senate floor; the Senate adopted the amendment without 
discussion. See 148 CONG. REC. 4226 (2002). The conference committee on the election bill rejected 
the Senate’s proposal for a study and instead kept the mandatory language from the House. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 107-730, at 79 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). The “standard oath” provision became law following 
enactment of the underlying election bill. See Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec. 
705(b)(2)(C), § 102(a), 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(5) 
(2018)). 
 267. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(i)(1), 20303(f)(1) (2018). These provisions trace their roots to the 
1942 military voting legislation: if a commissioned officer attested to a servicemember’s oath on the 
envelope accompanying a war ballot, that would “constitute prima facie evidence that the voter is 
qualified to vote, unless the statements contained in such oath indicate the contrary.” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 306(a) (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1944); see also id. § 308. However, Congress later allowed states 
to choose whether or not to accept commissioned officers’ attestations. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 325(b) 
(1946) (repealed 1955). Congress enacted the current notarization provisions in 2009, after committees 
in both chambers heard testimony about the burdens of locating a notary while deployed overseas. See 
Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 453, 469, 569–70, 608–
09 (2009); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 140–41, 168, 190, 
197–98 (2009). The notarization provisions originated in a Senate bill introduced that year which 
would have prohibiting states from rejecting a servicemember’s voter registration application, 
absentee ballot request, marked absentee ballot, or FWAB because the servicemember failed to have 
the document notarized. See S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 8(a)–(b) (as introduced, July 8, 2009). A Senate 
committee removed language characterizing notarization as a “technical” requirement. See S. 1415, 
111th Cong. § 9(a)–(b) (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009). The committee 
favorably reported the bill as amended. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & 
Admin., 111th Cong. 645 (2009). The bill’s chief sponsor announced he would propose the text of the 
reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See id. at 639. The 
notarization prohibition in the proposed amendment tracked the reported bill’s language exactly. See 
155 CONG. REC. 18,802 (2009). During Senate debate on the amendment, the chief sponsor noted the 
burden notary requirements impose on servicemembers stationed overseas: “I ask my colleagues, how 
can a marine in Fallujah find a notary? Why are we making things so hard?” Id. at 18,991 (statement 
of Sen. Chuck Schumer). The Senate adopted the amendment and passed the underlying defense 
authorization bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. The notarization language became law along with the 
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Aside from its mandates to states, federal law also requires federal 
agencies to play a supporting role in military voting. For instance, certain 
military offices must provide information about and assistance with the 
registration and voting process.268 Additionally, federal postal agencies 
will transport military election materials free of postage.269 For 
servicemembers serving outside the United States, the federal government 
collects marked ballots and delivers them to the appropriate election 
officials in the United States.270 
Congress might also enact new legislation. For instance, Congress 
recently considered an omnibus election reform bill which provides, 
among other things, an explicit private right of action for violations of 
UOCAVA.271 The bill also provides that in a UOCAVA enforcement 
action, “the only necessary party defendant is the State, and it shall not be 
a defense to any such action that a local election official or a unit of local 
government is not named as a defendant,”272 even if the state has 
delegated election administration duties to a local jurisdiction. Because 
many military voters submit a FWAB without first registering to vote, a 
broad array of voices has proposed requiring states to accept the FWAB 
as a voter registration instrument, potentially reducing the number of 
rejected military ballots.273 Congress could also consider ordering the 
 
rest of the military voting language attached to the defense authorization bill. See Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 582(a), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2327 (2009) 
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(i)(1) (2018)); id. sec. 582(b), § 103, 123 Stat. at 2327 (codified at 52 
U.S.C. § 20303(f)(1) (2018)). 
 268. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1566–1566a (2018). 
 269. See 39 U.S.C. § 3406 (2018). Congress first provided for free postage in World War II-era 
military voting legislation and expanded the categories of eligible materials over time. See 50 U.S.C. 
§ 303 (Supp. II 1942), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. IV 1944), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352 
(1946), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. IV 1950) (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3406 (2018)). 
 270. See 52 U.S.C. § 20304 (2018). 
 271. See H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1702(a) (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 164 (2019). Testimony before Congress has supported the addition to 
UOCAVA of a private right of action. See Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the MOVE 
Act in the 2010 Elections: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 253, 260, 900 (2011). 
The Uniform Law Commission recommends that states authorize a private right of action for 
injunctive relief as a matter of state law. See UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT § 18(a) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). For a discussion of whether UOCAVA contains an implied private right 
of action or whether private parties could sue to enforce it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Daniel P. Tokaji, 
Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. 
REV. 113, 142–46 (2010). 
 272. H.R. 1 § 1702(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 164. Such a provision would help 
defeat state arguments that states cannot be held liable under UOCAVA for the noncompliance of their 
local governments who typically administer elections. See Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 
supra note 71, at 764–71, 796. 
 273. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 468, 485 
(2009); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 59, 167 (2009); PCEA 
REPORT, supra note 70, at 60; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 57–58. 
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Department of Defense to automatically update election officials with a 
military voter’s new address every time the servicemember receives orders 
for a permanent change of station or for a lengthy deployment (or returns 
from such a deployment).274 
Additionally, social science evidence suggests that voter-friendly 
state rules regarding voter registration and ballot transit are positively 
correlated with rates of military ballot return and negatively correlated 
with military ballot rejection.275 This evidence could give credence to 
proposals both in the literature and among election administration 
practitioners for Congress to loosen restrictive state election regulations. 
For instance, scholars, election administrators, blue-ribbon election reform 
commissions, and even the Uniform Law Commission suggest that states 
be required to count military ballots voted and dispatched on or before 
election day but received some time after election day.276 Testimony 
before Congress has suggested requiring states to accept electronic 
transmission of election materials from servicemembers.277 
Other proposals seek to aid military voters by leveraging existing 
military infrastructure, such as the Common Access Card (CAC). Issued 
by the Department of Defense to servicemembers and related civilian 
personnel, the CAC is an identification card with embedded cryptographic 
 
 274. See, e.g., Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 612 
(2009) (testimony of Gail McGinn, Acting Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness, U.S. 
Department of Defense); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential 
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 
43–44 (2009) (testimony of Tom Bush, Acting Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program); cf. 52 
U.S.C. § 1566a(a)–(b). A permanent change of station is “[t]he detail, or transfer of a Service member 
or unit to a different [permanent duty station] under a competent travel order that does not specify the 
duty as temporary, provide for further assignment to a new [permanent duty station], or direct return 
to the old [permanent duty station].” Procedures for Military Personnel Assignments, Instruction No. 
1315.18, at 68 (U.S. Dep’t of Def. June 24, 2019). A deployment is “[t]he movement of forces into 
and out of an operational area.” OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3-35, DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS, at GL-7 (2018). 
 275. See Hall, supra note 76, at 164. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas 
civilians. See id. 
 276. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 609 
(2009) (testimony of Patricia Hollarn, former Supervisors of Elections, Okaloosa County, Florida); 
Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (testimony of Rokey 
W. Suleman, II, General Registrar, Fairfax County Office of Elections); UNIFORM MILITARY AND 
OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT §§ 10, 12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); JIMMY CARTER & JAMES A. BAKER, 
III ET AL., COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM ¶ 4.4.6, at 39 (2005); GERALD R. FORD & 
JIMMY CARTER ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND 
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 43 (2001); INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 98; 
Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 878; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 58–59. 
 277. See Compilations and Hearings and Markups: Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. 
on Rules & Admin., 113th Cong. 130, 159, 168, 169, 170 (2014). 
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technology containing biometric and other data which enables the user to 
access a host of secure online military computer systems and networks as 
well as physical military facilities and installations.278 Election 
administrators, veterans, and scholars alike have urged Congress to 
require states to accept the CAC and its digital authentication procedures 
as sufficient to identify a military voter for purposes of registration  
and voting.279 
To be clear, other sources of constitutional authority may empower 
Congress to enact some of the existing law and proposed legislation. The 
important point here is that the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause also authorizes congressional action.280 
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A. Scope: Purposeful Discrimination vs. Disparate Impact 
The first possible objection to potential Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation to address felon disenfranchisement and military 
voting concerns discriminatory purpose. Burdens on voting that merely 
impact men more than women—what might be termed “unconscious or 
accidental discrimination”281—are beyond the reach of Congress, the 
argument goes, because the creators of those burdens did not intend to 
deny or abridge men’s voting rights. However, the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment’s legislative history and the background legal environment in 
 
 278. See Technology for Secure Identity Documents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Government Management, Organization, and Procurement of the Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, Serial No. 110-90, 110th Cong. 18, 22 (2007) (testimony of Benjamin Brink, 
Assistant Public Printer for Security and Intelligent Documents, Government Printing Office); 
Mathison Hall, Commentary, Testing the Security of Government Sites, BALT. SUN, Mar. 10, 2016 
(News), at 15; Jon R. Lindsay, Surviving the Quantum Cryptocalypse, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Summer 
2020, at 49, 53. 
 279. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th 
Cong. 11, 21–23, 28, 33, 57–58, 60–61 (2013); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles 
and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 
111th Cong. 33–34 (2009) (testimony of Jessie Jane Duff, retired, U.S. Marine Corps.); INBODY, 
SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 159. 
 280. This Article takes no position on the merits of existing statutory protections or proposals 
for future legislation. Given the breadth of current protections and policy proposals—consider the 
wide gap between, for instance, requiring states to count military ballots received by mail in the days 
following election day and requiring states to accept military ballots cast via the Internet using 
Common Access Card authentication—policy questions lie beyond this Article’s scope. This Article 
seeks only to establish the bounds of congressional authority, not to attempt a normative defense of 
any particular idea. 
 281. David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the 
Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 289 (1998). 
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1919 demonstrate that the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power can 
reach barriers to the ballot lacking a discriminatory purpose.282 
1. Intratextualist Analysis 
Several scholars have argued that the discriminatory purpose 
requirement of other constitutional provisions limits the ability of 
Congress to enforce those constitutional provisions. These scholars 
observe that election rules or procedures violate neither the Fourteenth nor 
Fifteenth Amendment absent a discriminatory purpose to deny or abridge 
the right to vote on the basis of race or color.283 In light of the 
discriminatory intent requirement, these scholars argue that enforcement 
legislation which abrogates state felon disenfranchisement laws on the 
basis of a racially disparate impact alone is constitutionally 
questionable.284 Both courts and scholars have used a similar “intent” or 
“purpose” framework when analyzing the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 
light of the parallel language in the Fifteenth and Twenty-sixth 
Amendments.285 Applying these analyses to the similarly worded 
Nineteenth Amendment would suggest that the Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power cannot reach felon disenfranchisement laws  
or the voting difficulties that accompany military service unless states 
 
 282. This Article takes no position on whether the Nineteenth Amendment—of its own force, 
independently of any enforcement legislation—reaches state conduct lacking a discriminatory 
purpose. Cf. Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 69 & n.276; Fish, supra note 65, at 1216. 
 283. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62–70 (1980) (plurality opinion), 
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2(a), 96 
Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)); Travis Crum, The Superfluous 
Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549, 1563–64 (2020). Election regulations may violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment even in the absence of a racially discriminatory purpose if they fail a 
balancing test which weighs the burdens on voting against the state’s interest in its regulation. See 
Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1847–51 
(2013); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations 
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 318 (2007). That burdens/interests balancing test is not at 
issue here. 
 284. See Clegg et al., Case Against, supra note 61, at 14–16; Roger Clegg et al., The Bullet and 
the Ballot? The Case for Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1, 19–22 (2006); Clegg, Who Should Vote?, supra note 54, at 168–72; Hasen, Uncertain 
Congressional Power, supra note 54, at 780–83; von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1379–83. 
No scholarship engages in a similar analysis with regard to military voters. 
 285. See Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2020); League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc. 
v. Detzner, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1221 (N.D. Fla. 2018); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 188 F. 
Supp. 3d 577, 609–10 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 843 F.3d 592, 607 (4th Cir. 2016); N.C. State Conf. of NAACP 
v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 522–23 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 831 F.3d 204, 242 (4th 
Cir. 2016); Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–77; Fish, supra note 65, at 1216; Caitlin Foley, Comment, 
A Twenty-sixth Amendment Challenge to State Voter ID Laws, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 585, 615–16; 
Nancy Turner, Comment, The Young and the Restless: How the Twenty-sixth Amendment Could Play 
a Role in the Current Debate over Voting Laws, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1515 (2015). Compare U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV, § 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
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design these burdens with the intent of denying or abridging the voting 
rights of men. 
These intratextualist analyses do not compel the conclusion that 
Congress is bound by a discriminatory purpose requirement when enacting 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. Arguments to engraft a 
discriminatory purpose restriction onto the Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power “simply [due to] the similarity of its text to that of the 
Fifteenth [and Twenty-sixth] Amendment[s], without further 
explanation,” rest “on thin reasoning.”286 Intratextualist arguments that 
would limit the reach of enforcement legislation to state conduct bearing 
a discriminatory purpose ignore the background against which the Sixty-
sixth Congress proposed the Woman Suffrage Amendment to the states.287 
Indeed, courts explicitly recognize the possibility that an  
intentional discrimination requirement similar to that found in the 
Reconstruction Amendments may not carry over to other similarly worded 
constitutional provisions.288 
To be clear, courts and scholars need not jettison the intratextualist 
principle that “strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive) 
argument for parallel interpretation”289 to reject the contention that 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation may reach only 
purposeful discrimination. Rather, they need only recognize that the 
presumption for parallel interpretation can be overcome.290 As to the 
Nineteenth Amendment, that presumption is particularly weak. The 
presumption for parallel interpretation may be strongest when the history 
of a constitutional provision reveals little about original intent: when 
“advocates and opponents of [a provision] had a range of goals and 
rationales, many of which shifted over time,” turning the “search[] for a 
 
 286. Yael Bromberg, Youth Voting Rights and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1105, 1161–64 (2019). 
 287. Cf. Fish, supra note 65, at 1216. 
 288. See Lee, 843 F.3d at 607; Walgren v. Bd. of Selectmen of Amherst, 519 F.2d 1364, 1367 
(1st Cir. 1975); Nashville Student Org. Comm. v. Hargett, 155 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (M.D. Tenn. 
2015). 
 289. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; see also Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75; 
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12. 
 290. Even intratextualism’s primary scholarly champion agrees that “perhaps doctrinal rules for 
implementing the Fifteenth Amendment . . . should [in certain circumstances] diverge from those 
doctrinal rules implementing the Nineteenth Amendment, despite their textually parallel form.” Amar, 
Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202. This quote preceded language suggesting that if two 
textually similar constitutional provisions “were initially designed to work together, [but] their 
underlying problems have evolved in different ways,” then constitutional interpreters should “adapt 
each clause’s doctrine to fit the new shape of problems.” Id. at 800. But good cause to vary the 
constitutional interpretation of textually similar constitutional provisions can also arise for other 
reasons. See infra section IV.B.1. 
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dominant ‘original intent’ behind [the provision into] a quixotic task.”291 
But the clarity and consistency of the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s 
historical record and the subsequent (though limited) Nineteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence easily overcomes the intratextualist 
presumption to impute a purposeful discrimination requirement from the 
Reconstruction Amendments into the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement power. 
2. Legislative and Judicial history 
The legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 and its 
predecessors demonstrates that the Nineteenth Amendment empowers 
Congress to address barriers to the ballot that fall unequally between the 
sexes, irrespective of the intent behind those barriers. For instance, one 
report of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage stated that “ballot 
box . . . regulations [should be] designed to protect the voter and guarantee 
the freedom of elections,” and explained that if women are entitled to vote, 
“her right is equivalent to man, and like man, she should have [that right] 
unhampered by any restriction that is not common to both.”292 In other 
words, the suffrage supporters in Congress concerned themselves with 
ensuring equal access to the ballot between men and women, not on the 
motivation for any barriers to equal access. 
Supporting this broad read of congressional authority are the major 
concerns motivating the Sixty-sixth Congress to propose the Woman 
Suffrage Amendment to the states. Proponents of House Joint Resolution 
1 and its predecessors desired to reward women both for their public 
contributions to society (especially the war effort) and their private 
contributions as caregivers to the family, but suffrage supporters in 
Congress also sought to secure for themselves and their allies the political 
and electoral benefits of enfranchising a new class of voters.293 To 
accomplish those ends, the Sixty-sixth Congress sought to extend the 
ballot to women.294 If voting restrictions deprived women of the honor the 
franchise—and therefore also deprived members and their allies of this 
new source of electoral support—suffrage supporters undoubtedly would 
have mobilized in Congress to end these barriers, “whether or not [they] 
intentionally target[ed] women.”295 
 
 291. Cheng, supra note 133, at 668 (“ranges of goals and rationales”); id. at 673 (“quixotic task”). 
 292. See S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 1, 4 (1916). 
 293. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 554–59; supra Section II.B.2. 
 294. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong., 41 Stat. 362 (1919). 
 295. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 561. 
2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1199 
The Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in existence during the 
1919 passage of House Joint Resolution 1 supports this theory.296 The 
Supreme Court’s Fifteenth Amendment decisions as of 1919 required only 
that enforcement legislation bear some connection to the constitutional 
proscription against voting discrimination on account of race or color.297 
Beyond that, the Court respected the breadth and depth of the 
congressional enforcement power to protect voting rights.298  
“The Sixty-Sixth Congress understood this; it believed that its power to 
draft enforcement legislation was broad and that it had discretion to 
construct long chains connecting enforcement legislation to the 
constitutional prohibition.”299 
Legislative activity pursuant to the then-recently ratified Eighteenth 
Amendment further supports the argument that the Nineteenth 
Amendment enforcement power authorizes Congress to attack restrictions 
on the franchise even if the Nineteenth Amendment does not itself prohibit 
those restrictions.300 The Sixty-sixth Congress enacted Eighteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation which prohibited a broader swath of 
conduct than prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment itself, suggesting 
Congress possesses similar authority under its Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power. 
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only “the manufacture, sale, 
or transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . for beverage purposes.”301 
The Sixty-sixth Congress—the same Congress to propose the Woman 
Suffrage Amendment to the states—enacted Eighteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation which exceed the scope of the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition in two important ways. First, the legislation—
formally entitled the National Prohibition Act and commonly called the 
Volstead Act—prohibited (among other things) the possession of 
intoxicating liquors,302 even though the Eighteenth Amendment did not. 
Second, the statute defined “intoxicating liquor” as 
alcohol, brandy, whisky [sic], rum, gin, beer, ale, porter, and wine, 
and in addition thereto any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented 
 
 296. For additional discussion of the state of Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1919, see  
id. at 549–51. 
 297. See id. at 549–51. 
 298. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884). 
 299. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 551. 
 300. For additional discussion of the role the Eighteenth Amendment plays in the interpretation 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, see id. at 546–49. 
 301. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 302. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308 (1919) (emphasis 
added) (repealed 1935). The informal title “Volstead Act” came from the statute’s chief sponsor, Rep. 
Andrew Volstead of Minnesota. See Scott Schaeffer, The Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the 
Eighteenth Amendment: Chicago and the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL. 385, 398 (2011). 
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liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, 
patented, or not, and by whatever name called, containing one-
half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume which are fit 
for use for beverage purposes[.]303 
This contrasted with the Eighteenth Amendment itself, which 
contained but did not define the term “intoxicating liquor.” However, 
“leading physicians, chemists, and toxicologists” of the era believed “that 
liquids containing less than 2.75 per cent alcohol are not intoxicating” 
because a human body could not consume a sufficient volume of these 
liquids quickly enough to introduce alcohol into the bloodstream faster 
than the body would metabolize the alcohol out of the bloodstream.304 As 
a biological matter, these medical and scientific professionals opined, such 
a “liquid cannot possibly intoxicate.”305 In other words, while the 
Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only intoxicating liquors, Congress 
prohibited non-intoxicating fluids, as well. 
Courts sanctioned the statute’s overbreadth on both counts. Lower 
courts repeatedly upheld congressional authority to prohibit the possession 
of alcoholic beverages, notwithstanding that the Eighteenth Amendment 
did not prohibit possession.306 In a decision issued three days after the 
ratification of the Woman Suffrage Amendment, the Supreme Court 
upheld the National Prohibition Act against claims that its one-half-of-
one-percent definition impermissibly broadened the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s scope: 
While recognizing that there are limits beyond which Congress 
cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of 
enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the 
provision of the Volstead Act (title 2, § 1), wherein liquors 
containing as much as one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume 
and fit for use for beverage purposes are treated as within that 
power.307 
Contemporaneous scholarship agreed that Congress could prohibit 
beverages with only minimal alcohol content and even non-alcoholic 
 
 303. Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, § 1, 41 Stat. at 307–08 (emphasis added). 
 304. Defining the Term “Intoxicating Liquors” Under the Wartime Prohibition Act and the 
Eighteenth Amendment, 89 CENT. L.J. 57, 58 (1919). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See, e.g., Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5, 7–9 (4th Cir. 1926); Jordan v. United States, 
299 F. 298, 299 (9th Cir. 1924); Massey v. United States, 281 F.3d 293, 294–95 (8th 1922); Page v. 
United States, 278 F. 41, 43–44 (9th Cir. 1922); Rose v. United States, 274 F. 245, 248–49 (6th Cir. 
1921). 
 307. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387–88 (1920); see also Vigliotti v. 
Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408–09 (1922). 
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beverages in its quest to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
on intoxicating liquors.308 
In other words, both the Supreme Court and the literature endorsed 
the view of the Sixty-sixth Congress that the Eighteenth Amendment 
enforcement power allowed legislation to sweep more broadly than the 
Eighteenth Amendment itself.309 Given the similarly worded enforcement 
language in the Woman Suffrage Amendment (which, again, was 
proposed by the same Congress that enacted the National Prohibition Act), 
the Supreme Court’s decision suggests that the Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power reaches barriers to the ballot restricting one  
sex more heavily than the other, irrespective of the intent or purpose 
behind the restriction. 
Nothing in the limited Nineteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
contradicts this read of the legislative history and the background 
jurisprudence of the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendment Enforcement 
Clauses. The Supreme Court has never held that the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment limits Congress to combating only those voting restrictions 
intended to keep voters from the voting booth on account of sex.310 In fact, 
the Supreme Court has applied the Nineteenth Amendment in only two 
decisions, the first of which merely decided that the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment became a valid part of the Constitution.311 
To be clear, the second decision used language suggesting that state 
action purposefully designed to depress the vote of one sex over another 
would violate the Woman Suffrage Amendment. On review of a 
Nineteenth Amendment challenge to a Georgia state statute, the Supreme 
Court wrote, “It is fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law is a mere 
disguise under which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote on account 
of their sex.”312 But neither the quoted language nor the decision as whole 
concern the congressional enforcement power and cannot be said to 
 
 308. See Wayne B. Wheeler, The Power of Congress to Define the Term Intoxicating Liquor, 89 
CENT. L.J. 320, 321 (1919); see also George Cyrus Thorpe, Intoxicating Liquor Law, 14 Geo. L.J. 
315, 319–20 (1926). But see W.W. Thornton, Legislative Definition of Constitutional Terms—
”Intoxicating Liquors,” 90 CENT. L.J. 389, 393–94 (1920). 
 309. The judiciary continued its endorsement of a broad Eighteenth Amendment enforcement 
power in later years. For instance, the Supreme Court upheld a 1921 statute enacted by the Sixty-
Seventh Congress barring the prescription of malt liquors for medical purposes, even though the 
Eighteenth Amendment itself only prohibited liquor for beverage purposes. See James Everard’s 
Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–63 (1924). 
 310. Modern scholars even question whether “discriminatory purpose is always required to 
establish a constitutional violation,” independent of any enforcement legislation. Hasen & Litman, 
supra note 4, at 69 n.276. 
 311. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922). 
 312. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 284 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. 
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
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address the limits of that power.313 Additionally, scholars have identified 
a series of objections to the decision—its explicit sexism, implicit racism, 
intellectual shortcomings, and inconsistency with modern voting rights 
jurisprudence—suggesting that the decision possesses little precedential 
value, whatever its holding.314 
Between the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1, the state 
of Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1919, the enactment by the 
Sixty-sixth Congress of Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, 
and the limited Nineteenth Amendment jurisprudence to date, the evidence 
demonstrates that the congressional power to enforce the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment sweeps more broadly than the congressional power to enforce 
the Reconstruction Amendments. Whether or not the Nineteenth 
Amendment itself—of its own force, independently of any enforcement 
legislation—reaches beyond intentional voting discrimination, the 
Woman Suffrage Amendment empowers Congress to combat so-called 
“unconscious or accidental discrimination”315 in voting on account of sex. 
B. Standard of Review: “Congruence and Proportionality” Versus 
“Reasonable Relation” 
A second possible objection to a robust Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power capable of addressing felon disenfranchisement and 
military voting relates to the standard of review. This possible objection 
argues that courts must subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation to the demanding “congruence and proportionality” standard of 
review that has become a hallmark of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than to the deferential 
“reasonable relation” standard of review the Sixty-sixth Congress 
expected. Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation addressing 
felon disenfranchisement and military voting, the argument goes, would 
not meet this heightened level of scrutiny. However, the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment sufficiently differs from the Fourteenth Amendment such that 
 
 313. See id. at 283–84. In any event, language suggesting that the Nineteenth Amendment 
prohibits purposeful discrimination does not negate the possibility that the provision also prohibits the 
denial or abridgment of the right to vote absent a discriminatory purpose. Cf. Bromberg, supra note 
286, at 1164. 
 314. Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 35–38; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 539. But see Ronnie L. 
Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the Women’s Poll Tax Repeal 
Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 839, 887 (1998). For an account 
of the legal history leading from Breedlove to Harper, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, 
Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 75–123 
(2009). 
 315. Crump, supra note 281, at 289. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment standard of review does not apply to 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. 
1. Intratextualist Analysis 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions  
of this article.”316 “For Congress’s action to fall within its  
Section 5 authority, . . . ‘[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means  
adopted to that end.’”317 This standard is more demanding than the 
standard previously applied to enforcement legislation under the 
Reconstruction Amendments.318 
The question of whether this new Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence applies to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
has received little attention.319 However, a robust debate in the literature 
questions whether Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation must 
meet this heightened standard.320 Lower courts are divided.321 To scholars’ 
dismay, the Supreme Court has twice declined to decide the issue.322 
 
 316. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 317. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
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305–306 (2015). 
 319. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 559–60. 
 320. Compare Joshua S. Sellers, The Irony of Intent: Statutory Interpretation and the 
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 LA. L. REV. 43, 46 (2015), with Janai S. 
Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 635 n.273 (2013), and 
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As Well, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 483, 503 (2012). 
 321. Compare Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241–46 
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (rational basis), rev’d on statutory grounds, 557 U.S. 193, 204 
(2009) (expressing no opinion), with Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457–62 (D.D.C. 
2011) (congruence and proportionality), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (congruence and 
proportionality), rev’d, 570 U.S. 529, 542 n.1 (2013) (noting cryptically that “Northwest Austin guides 
our review under both [the Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments”). 
 322. See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal 
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 384–85 (2014); 
Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1576; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, States’ 
Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 484 (2014); Christopher S. Elmendorf, 
Advisory Rulemaking and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 14 ELECTION L.J. 260, 262 n.19 (2015); 
Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 
727–28 (2014); Franita Tolson, The Law of Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of 
Voting Rights and the Judicial Regulation of the Political Thicket, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 348 
n.18 (2016). But see Calvin Massey, The Effect of Shelby County on Enforcement of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 29 J. L. & POL. 397, 404 (2014). 
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One set of scholarship argues that the stricter congruence and 
proportionality standard applies to Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation: 
Both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment have materially identical language, 
empowering Congress to “enforce” the respective provisions of 
each Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” They were enacted 
barely a half year apart from each other as part of Reconstruction. 
The Court has previously interpreted both provisions in an 
identical manner, analogizing both provisions to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. And both provisions raise the same separation-
of-powers concerns about the respective roles of Congress and the 
courts in constitutional interpretation.323 
Related scholarship analyzes potential Fifteenth Amendment 
legislation abrogating state felon disenfranchisement laws.324 This 
literature generally contends that such enforcement legislation would fail 
to demonstrate the congruence and proportionality necessary to withstand 
a constitutional challenge.325 
Two of the arguments for extending the congruence and 
proportionality standard from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fifteenth 
Amendment rely on the related nature of these Reconstruction 
Amendments: their shared purpose and their ratification in close temporal 
proximity.326 These points plainly do not apply to the Nineteenth 
Amendment. For instance, while the states may have ratified both the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments within two years of one another, 
the Nineteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution over a half-
 
 323. Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New 
Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see 
also Roger Clegg & Linda Chavez, An Analysis of the Reauthorized Sections 5 and 203 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965: Bad Policy and Unconstitutional, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 569–70 (2007); 
Mark A. Posner, Time is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of 
Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 88–89 (2006); Joshua P. Thompson, 
Towards a Post-Shelby County Section 5 Where a Constitutional Coverage Formula Does Not 
Reauthorize the Effects Test, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 585, 590 (2014); Glenn Kunkes, Note, The Times, 
They Are Changing: The VRA Is No Longer Constitutional, 27 J.L. & POL. 357, 365 (2012). Some 
scholarship merely predicts that the congruence-and-proportionality standard will apply in the 
Fifteenth Amendment context without defending the proposition. See Evan H. Caminker, 
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1191 n.269 
(2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies 
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 725 n.5 (1998). 
 324. No scholarship discusses whether Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to protect 
military voting rights would meet the test of congruence and proportionality. 
 325. See Clegg, Who Should Vote?, supra note 54, at 171–72; Hasen, Uncertain Congressional 
Power, supra note 54, at 780–83. 
 326. See, e.g., Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting, supra note 323, at 2078. 
2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1205 
century after Reconstruction.327 “When the parallel provisions featured by 
intratextualist analysis are found in parts of the document enacted at 
different times, the originalist evidentiary value of the comparison drops 
off sharply.”328 Additionally, the Nineteenth Amendment lacks the 
common congressional purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments: while 
the Fourteenth and Fifteen Amendments were both adopted to protect 
newly freed slaves, the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted to extend the 
franchise to women.329 
The third argument points to the nearly identical text of the 
enforcement language in both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.330 The Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause also 
contains language nearly identical to section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.331 All else being equal, the intratextualist principle that 
“strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive) argument for parallel 
interpretation”332 would suggest that the congruence and proportionality 
test applies to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation just as it 
does to Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. 
All else is not equal: key differences between the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments overcome the intratextualist presumption to 
interpret similar language similarly.333 Scholars have identified multiple 
arguments concerning the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which 
counsel against applying the congruence and proportionality test to 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.334 Each applies with equal 
force to the Nineteenth Amendment. 
The first argument might be characterized as an application of the 
constitutional canon against surplusage: the presumption that no 
 
 327. Compare Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 Stat. 708, 710–11 (1868), and 
Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, 16 Stat. 1131, 1131–32 (1870), with Ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, 41 Stat. 1823, 1823 (1920). 
 328. Adrian Vermeule and Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble With 
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 765 (2000). 
 329. Compare KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 69–83, with id. at 139–78. 
 330. See, e.g., Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting, supra note 323, at 2078. 
 331. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 with U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2. 
 332. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; see also Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75; 
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12. 
 333. Cf. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202. 
 334. This Article assumes that congruence-and-proportionality review properly applies to 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation and seeks to establish why the same is not true of 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. The soundness of that assumption is beyond this 
Article’s scope. For contrary arguments, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 361–63 (1st ed. 2005); Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1801, 1810–15 (2010); Caminker, supra note 323, at 1133; Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 
1625; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 188 (1997). But see Cantu, supra note 318, at 124. 
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constitutional provision renders another provision superfluous or 
redundant.335 This argument contends that the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
protection of the right to vote against denial and abridgment on account of 
race or color must have some legal effect distinct from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.336 Because the 
two constitutional provisions operate in different spheres, the argument 
goes, they warrant different standards of review—especially in light of the 
importance of the right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment.337 
The second point relates to the “specificity maxim”—that is, the 
principle that when two statutory or constitutional provisions “arguably 
cover the same subject, the one more specifically addressing the shared 
topic governs, displacing whatever authority the more general statute [or 
constitutional provision] might have provided on the question.”338 
Applying the specificity maxim would employ the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
more specific race-based protection in lieu of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s more general race-neutral voting rights protections when 
both provisions could conceivably apply.339 “Giving the Fifteenth 
Amendment independent meaning for Congress’s enforcement authority,” 
this argument goes, “follows the principle that the specific should control 
over the general.”340 
The third argument concerns checks and balances. Scholars making 
this point maintain that a tougher standard of review acts to guard against 
congressional abuse of its broad Fourteenth Amendment powers, while the 
narrow, voting-focused scope of the Fifteenth Amendment already serves 
 
 335. See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 654–55 
(2016). 
 336. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1565–66; Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Comment, The 
Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 
1500–01 (2014). 
 337. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1565–66; Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft: 
It’s the End of Section 5 as We Know It (and I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265, 287–88 (2005); 
Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 
225, 274 (2003); Amar-Dolan, supra note 336, at 1500–01. 
 338. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 2012 (2011). 
 339. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1566. For an explanation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s race-neutral voting rights protection, see id. at 1563–64; Elmendorf, Structuring 
Judicial Review, supra note 283, at 318; Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, supra note 283, 
at 1847–51. 
 340. See Crum, Superfluous, supra not 283, at 1626. 
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to limit congressional authority.341 Therefore, the argument goes, courts 
should apply less scrutiny to Fifteenth Amendment legislation.342 
Each of these arguments concerning the Fifteenth Amendment 
applies with equal force to the Nineteenth Amendment.343 In fact, two 
scholars have already applied the third argument to the Nineteenth 
Amendment.344 But factors unique to the Woman Suffrage Amendment 
also demonstrate that Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
need not demonstrate congruence and proportionality in order to withstand 
a constitutional challenge. Perhaps most persuasive of all is the legislative 
history of the Woman Suffrage Amendment and the background legal 
environment in which the Sixty-sixth Congress adopted House Joint 
Resolution 1.345 
2. Legislative and Judicial history 
The congruence-and-proportionality doctrine did not exist at the time 
of the 1919 adoption of House Joint Resolution 1 or the 1920 ratification 
of the Nineteenth Amendment.346 However, the Sixty-sixth Congress was 
very familiar with a less stringent “reasonable relation” standard of review 
for enforcement legislation, having enacted Eighteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation—the National Prohibition Act—on the express 
assumption that courts would uphold the legislation so long as it was 
reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose. 
 
 341. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 109, 119–20 (2013); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1626; Kanwar, supra note 318, at 
306; Pitts, Once and Future Remedy, supra note 337, at 274–75; Amar-Dolan, supra note 336, at 
1499–1500; Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting 
the Right Answer With the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 251–52 (2012); Rosemarie 
Unite, Comment, The Perrymander, Polarization, and Peyote v. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 46 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1075, 1118–19 (2013). 
 342. See Amar, Lawfulness, supra note 341, at 119–20; Kanwar, supra note 318, at 306; Amar-
Dolan, supra note 336, at 1499–1500; Burns, supra note 341, at 251–52. 
 343. A fourth point contends that courts should apply a more deferential standard of review to 
ease the extraordinary cost required for Congress to develop—and for the executive branch to 
defend—an evidentiary record sufficient to satisfy the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry. See 
Burns, supra note 341, at 250–51. This is more of an argument against congruence-and-proportionality 
as a general matter than it is an argument to distinguish the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
standards of review. A fifth argument concerns fidelity to existing Supreme Court precedent applying 
a less stringent standard to Fifteenth Amendment legislation. See id. at 247–49; Crum, Superfluous, 
supra note 283, at 1568; Pitts, I Feel Fine, supra note 337, at 287; Pitts, A Once and Future Remedy, 
supra note 337, at 273–74. This argument does not apply to the Woman Suffrage Amendment given 
the absence of Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation and the consequent absence of 
decisions reviewing such legislation’s constitutionality. 
 344. See Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 66. 
 345. Cf. Fish, supra note 65, at 1226–27. 
 346. See Balkin, supra note 334, at 1810–12; Caminker, supra note 323, at 1143. 
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In the House, the Judiciary Committee’s report on the National 
Prohibition Act stated that Eighteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation would withstand constitutional challenge unless “Congress 
could have no reason to believe that its provisions are either necessary or 
appropriate for carrying such power into execution.”347 For support, the 
report cited then-recent Supreme Court decisions describing the inquiry as 
whether the challenged legislation had “any reasonable relation to the 
object sought.”348 The Senate’s Judiciary Committee claimed Congress 
had similar authority: that committee’s report on the National Prohibition 
Act claimed the Eighteenth Amendment enforcement power “carries with 
it the power to enact any law having a reasonable relation to the end sought 
by the original authorized act.”349 
When the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld congressional 
Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation several years later, it 
essentially ratified the two committees’ views concerning the scope of 
judicial review.350 Given that the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments 
used substantially identical language to vest Congress with enforcement 
authority,351 this Eighteenth Amendment legislative activity suggests that 
Congress expected courts to subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation to similarly deferential review. 
Supporting this conclusion is the Fifteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence existing in 1919. Those decisions endorsed a robust 
congressional enforcement power352—so long as the legislation 
maintained the relevant anchor to the voting discrimination on account of 
race or color.353 
Finally, the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 and its 
predecessors demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress expected to vest 
itself with substantial authority to enforce the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment against the states.354 Combined with the Eighteenth 
Amendment legislative activity and the Fifteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, this history demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress 
understood that any enforcement legislation would receive deferential 
review from the courts. This judicial deference is inconsistent with the 
 
 347. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4 (1919). 
 348. Id. at 6. 
 349. S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919). 
 350. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 593–97 (1926); Selzman v. United States, 268 
U.S. 466, 468–69 (1925); James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–60 (1924). 
 351. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, with 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2. 
 352. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884). 
 353. See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903). 
 354. See Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 67; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 544–46. 
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congruence-and-proportionality standard applied to Fourteenth 
Amendment legislation which the Supreme Court first began applying 
nearly eight decades after the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s ratification. 
Accordingly, Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation need not 
meet such a heightened standard. 
C. Federalism: State Power vs. Congressional Authority 
A third potential objection argues that other constitutional provisions 
empower Congress to enact the voting rights legislation discussed in this 
Article, rendering the Nineteenth Amendment supplementary at best and 
superfluous at worst.355 This objection warrants two responses. 
The first response is that this objection undervalues complementary 
sources of congressional power. When multiple constitutional provisions 
provide authority for Congress to enact a single piece of legislation, this 
strengthens the constitutionality of that legislation.356 The existence of 
multiple sources of authority not only entitles the legislative record 
supporting enactment to increased judicial deference, but also enlarges the 
set of tools available to Congress for furthering its legislative aims.357 Even 
if other constitutional provisions authorize Congress to enact the existing 
and proposed voting rights legislation outlined in this Article, the 
Nineteenth Amendment nonetheless strengthens the constitutional basis 
for this legislation. 
The second response to the “supplementary or superfluous” 
objection is that other constitutional provisions may not provide Congress 
sufficient authority to adequately address felon disenfranchisement and 
military voting. In addition to the standard federalism concerns about 
federal intrusion into state prerogatives,358 the states’ explicit 
constitutional authority under the Voter Qualifications Clauses359 to fix the 
 
 355. For instance, the Postal Clause plainly empowers Congress to permit mailing of military 
election materials free of postage, irrespective of the Nineteenth Amendment. See David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 633–34 (1996). 
Likewise, Congress does not need the Nineteenth Amendment in order to require federal criminal 
justice agencies to assist federal probationers, parolees, and inmates with determining whether they 
are eligible to vote and (if eligible) with voter registration; little doubt exists that Congress may instead 
rely on its power to create and assign duties to federal agencies arising from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. See David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 71, 91 (2009). 
 356. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1086–
88 (2016). 
 357. See Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 329–37. 
 358. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Federalism as a Constitutional Concept, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
961, 971–72 (2017). 
 359. “[T]he Electors [voting in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives] in each State 
shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. “The electors [voting in elections for the U.S. Senate] in 
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qualifications of their voters360 may further limit congressional power 
under other constitutional provisions. The discussion that follows 
considers several alternate sources of congressional power to protect 
voting rights, proceeding in the order in which the provisions appear in the 
Constitution. 
1. Elections Clause361 
Multiple scholars argue that the Elections Clause should serve as the 
primary constitutional authority for new voting rights legislation.362 The 
Elections Clause certainly empowers Congress to enact at least some of 
the existing and proposed federal legislation to protect voters with criminal 
convictions and voters serving in the armed forces. However, the provision 
is subject to two important limitations: the Elections Clause offers 
Congress minimal authority over (1) non-federal elections and (2) voter 
qualifications standards. 
To be clear, the Elections Clause offers Congress a broad array of 
powers to enforce voting rights notwithstanding its limitations. Under the 
Elections Clause, Congress may regulate virtually all aspects of the 
election ecosystem.363 The provision offers Congress plenary authority 
over federal elections, but also over non-federal elections to the extent that 
the state uses some part of the federal election machinery to conduct the 
non-federal election.364 Under the Elections Clause, Congress may both 
displace state election law and commandeer state officials to administer 
the federal election regime.365 
In fact, the Elections Clause likely justifies much of the existing and 
proposed legislation to assist voters with felony convictions and voters in 
 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State 
legislatures.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 1. Existing scholarship argues that these two provisions 
should be interpreted identically. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The 
Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1996). 
 360. See, e.g., Husted v. A Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018). 
 361. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make 
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, 
cl. 1. 
 362. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 95, 107–13 (2013); Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, supra note 71, at 800. 
 363. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 5331 U.S. 510, 511–12 (2001); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 
15, 24–25 (1972); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 
 364. “So, for example, defendants have been convicted in federal court for vote buying with 
respect to local offices that appeared on the same ballot as even uncontested primaries for 
congressional office.” Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and 
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2007) (citing United States v. McCranie, 169 
F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 365. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the 
Antidiscrimination Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211, 2278–83 (2018). 
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the armed forces. For instance, there appears to be no serious dispute that 
the Elections Clause justifies most of UOCAVA’s procedural rules that 
pertain to federal elections.366 The Elections Clause likely also provides 
constitutional authority, at minimum, for the legislative proposals to 
support voters with criminal convictions that stop short of directly 
abrogating state felon disenfranchisement rules.367 
However, the Elections Clause does not provide Congress with all 
the power necessary to protect voting rights. Because the Elections Clause 
does not fully extend to non-federal elections and because states’ power to 
set voter qualifications limits the provision’s reach, the Elections Clause 
represents an imperfect tool for Congress to protect military voters and 
voters with criminal convictions. 
i. Non-Federal Elections 
The first challenge facing Elections Clause legislation is that the 
Elections Clause does not empower Congress with authority over matters 
relating solely to state or local elections.368 By its terms, the Elections 
Clause applies only to “Elections for Senators and Representatives.”369 
Given this limitation, the Elections Clause cannot support legislation—
like the SCRA’s voting provision—which by its terms applies to “voting 
for . . . a State or local office.”370 
The Elections Clause’s restricted scope has not historically proven 
significant because states—as a matter of administrative convenience—
generally use the same systems and processes for both federal and non-
federal elections.371 However, the limitation may soon have more force 
 
 366. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 81, at 463; Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 370; Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 864–65 (2017). 
 367. For instance, the Elections Clause would likely justify federal legislation requiring (1) states 
to designate probation and parole offices and corrections institutions as voter registration agencies 
under the NVRA, (2) probation, parole, and corrections officers to assist their supervised or 
incarcerated population with determinations of voting eligibility and (for those eligible to vote) with 
voter registration, and (3) judges to make pre-trial or pre-plea disclosure to defendants concerning the 
impact of a criminal conviction on the right to vote. Cf. ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836–37 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995); ACRON v. Edgar, 56 
F.3d 791, 94–96 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 368. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); David S. Louk, Reconstructing the 
Congressional Guarantee of Republican Government, 73 VAND. L. REV. 673, 738 (2020); Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 106 
(2014). 
 369. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has similar 
regulatory authority over presidential elections. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–
48 (1934). 
 370. 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a) (2018); see also Louk, supra note 368, at 738; Tokaji, Grand Election 
Bargain, supra note 368, at 106. 
 371. See Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial 
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 779 n.87 (2016); Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Election 
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given the recent trend of states seeking to divide their federal and non-
federal election machinery.372 Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, and 
Virginia have all attempted—so far, mostly without success—to avoid 
applying certain federally-mandated election rules to state and local 
elections by creating dual election regimes.373 Recent scholarship 
encourages more states to follow suit so they can partially escape the 
dictates of Elections Clause legislation.374 
Scholars disagree on the likelihood that states will segregate their 
federal election systems and processes from their non-federal election 
systems and processes.375 To the extent that states do consummate the 
divorce, the Elections Clause will be a less effective tool for enforcing the 
voting rights of servicemembers and individuals with criminal 
convictions. For example, states with dual registration systems might use 
the FPCA to register servicemembers to vote for only federal elections but 
not state or local contests. States might send blank absentee ballots to 
military voters fewer than forty-five days ahead of elections with no 
federal contests on the ballot—or (in an extreme case) fail to send absentee 
ballots for these exclusively non-federal elections at all. If future 
legislation were to require states to count late-arriving military votes, 
states could refuse to count these votes in state or local contests. States 
might also refuse to count FWABs in state or local contests. Elections 
Clause legislation may not be able to reach these burdens because they do 
not impact federal elections. States might permit voters with felony 
convictions enfranchised by Elections Clause legislation to vote only for 
presidential electors and members of Congress, but not state or local 
offices or ballot initiatives. 
The literature suggests one potential solution: that other 
constitutional provisions may “prohibit[] states from divorcing state and 
federal [election systems] in order to impose more onerous requirements 
on those seeking to participate in state elections.”376 Far from giving states 
 
System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and Local Elections, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 
103–04 (2017). 
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 373. See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1997) (Mississippi); LULAC v. Reagan, No. 
CV17-4102 PHX DGC, 2018 WL 5983009, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2018) (Arizona); Belenky v. 
Kobach, No. 13-4150-EFM-KMH, 2014 WL 1374048, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 2014) (Kansas); Haskins 
v. Davis, 253 F. Supp. 642, 642 (E.D. Va. 1966) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (Virginia); Orr v. 
Edgar, 670 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Illinois). 
 374. See Morley, Unitary Election System, supra note 371, at 118–24. 
 375. Compare Tokaji, Grand Election Bargain, supra note 368, at 106, with Louk, supra note 
368, at 738–39. 
 376. Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause 
of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 211 (2015). 
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carte blanche to burden the right to vote in state or local elections, this 
scholarship argues that the two Voter Qualifications Clauses “require[] 
that states aggressively protect political participation.”377 However,  
even if this argument proves valid, its dependence on judicial enforcement 
still leaves the Elections Clause at a disadvantage compared to the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
According to the scholarship originating the theory, the Founders 
inserted the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I in order to defend the 
franchise—well protected under Founding-era state constitutions—from 
federal government encroachment.378 To protect against this perceived 
federal threat, this scholarship argues, the Voter Qualifications Clause 
barred the disenfranchisement in federal elections of voters already 
entitled to vote under state law.379 
The scholarship further contends that Founding-era “alter or abolish” 
authority380—a remarkable democratic mechanism which enabled a state’s 
citizens “to displace state laws with which they disagreed; to hold 
constitutional conventions independent of the legislature; to revise their 
state constitutions without official ratification; and to form new states”—
best exemplifies the “citizen political participation and state political 
norms” the Founders expected the Voter Qualifications Clause (of Article 
I) to protect.381 During Reconstruction, the argument continues, expanded 
access to the franchise succeeded the “alter or abolish” authority as the 
means by which the people would exercise political power.382 Therefore, 
the scholarship reasons, the Voter Qualifications Clauses must be read to 
require protection of the right to vote against state infringement, much as 
it protected Founding-era forms of political participation over two 
centuries ago.383 This state obligation to protect voting rights, the 
scholarship concludes, manifests itself in the form of heightened judicial 
scrutiny of restrictive state election regulations.384 Courts applying this 
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Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 227–28 (1986). 
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 381. See id. at 187–89. 
 382. Id. at 189. 
 383. Id. at 162–63. 
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heightened scrutiny would bar states from separating their federal and 
non-federal election machinery in order to impose more burdens on voting 
in non-federal elections than Elections Clause legislation allows for 
federal elections.385 
Assuming it otherwise proves sound, this argument’s reliance on 
judicial enforcement could prove problematic. Courts faced with 
constitutional arguments for protection of the franchise have both 
historically and recently proven inconsistent guardians of the right to 
vote.386 If the judiciary proves unwilling to strike dual election systems 
notwithstanding their inconsistency with states’ obligation under the Voter 
Qualifications Clauses to protect voting rights, then states will remain free 
to shield their non-federal elections from Elections Clause legislation. 
This potential vulnerability shows the utility of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. Because the Woman Suffrage Amendment entrusts Congress 
rather than courts with enforcement authority, the Nineteenth Amendment 
does not depend on judges’ willingness to strike dual election systems 
before Congress may legislate with respect to state and local elections. 
Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
power extends to all elections,387 allowing Congress to regulate purely 
state or local elections irrespective of whether a state divides its federal 
and non-federal election system. The broader reach of the Nineteenth 
Amendment therefore advantages its enforcement legislation over similar 
legislation enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause. 
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses 
The second challenge facing the Elections Clause is its limited reach 
into state over voter qualifications.388 This limitation impedes Elections 
Clause legislation that attempts to protect the voting rights of 
servicemembers and individuals with criminal convictions by  
means which intrude on the state prerogative to determine the bounds of 
the electorate. 
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88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874). 
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application to certain elections. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1., with id. amend. XIX, para. 1. 
 388. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2013); Stephen E. 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized states’ authority to set the 
qualifications of their voters.389 In a departure from earlier precedent,390 
the Supreme Court recently held that the Voter Qualifications Clauses 
empower states alone to determine the bounds of their electorate—without 
interference from Elections Clause legislation.391 Several scholars argue 
that Elections Clause legislation cannot abrogate state felon 
disenfranchisement rules because states, not Congress, possess the power 
to decide whether a criminal record disqualifies a person from voting.392 
Likewise, the SCRA’s voting provision may not constitute valid Elections 
Clause legislation—even as applied to federal elections—because the 
statute requires states to include in the electorate certain servicemembers 
who would, by virtue of their temporary residence in the state, not 
otherwise be eligible voters. 
State authority to set voter qualifications can also pose an obstacle to 
Elections Clause legislation which regulates the time, place, or manner of 
federal elections even if that legislation does not purport to define the 
contours of the electorate. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the Voter Qualifications Clauses directly limit 
congressional Elections Clause authority: “it would raise serious 
constitutional doubts,” the Court explained, “if a federal statute precluded 
a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter 
qualifications.”393 Scholars caution that this language bolsters state power 
to resist Elections Clause legislation.394 
The principle that Elections Clause legislation cannot interfere with 
a state’s ability to determine a voter’s qualifications could create an 
obstacle for Elections Clause legislation to assist military voters. For 
instance, if Congress were to require states to permit servicemembers to 
register or vote electronically using their Common Access Card, a state 
might argue that the Common Access Card does not sufficiently permit 
the state to determine such a servicemember’s identity, interfering with the 
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state’s ability to gauge the servicemember’s eligibility to vote. A state 
might likewise argue that the standard oath printed on the FPCA and 
FWAB are insufficient for the state to determine the eligibility of a 
servicemember to register or vote, and that UOCAVA’s language 
requiring the state to accept this oath precludes the state from enforcing its 
voter qualifications. In an extreme case, a state might even object to 
providing absentee voting at all—notwithstanding UOCAVA’s 
requirement to provide servicemembers with absentee ballots—by arguing 
that only in-person appearance at a polling place suffices for the state to 
determine the identity of a servicemember (and therefore, the 
servicemember’s eligibility to vote). 
The Elections Clause’s limited reach into voter qualifications could 
also prove problematic for legislation to assist voters with criminal 
convictions. Consider a state law conditioning the restoration of a felon’s 
voting rights on the payment of financial obligations associated with the 
conviction. Like many election rules, such a state law defies easy 
classification as either a time, place, and manner regulation (over which 
Congress exercises plenary authority) on one hand or a voter qualifications 
standard (over which states maintain firm control) on the other.395 If the 
financial obligations are mere procedural incidents of the voting rights 
restoration process, Elections Clause legislation could justifiably prohibit 
the state law. If the payment of these financial obligations constitutes an 
independent qualification for voting—separate and apart from the 
conviction itself—then Election Clause legislation would not suffice to bar 
states from conditioning restoration on payment. 
The literature offers two theories to strengthen Elections Clause 
legislation against state efforts to weaponize their qualifications-setting 
authority to voters’ detriment. As discussed earlier, the first theory posits 
that the Voter Qualifications Clauses impose an affirmative duty on states 
to use their qualifications-setting power to protect voting rights rather than 
burden them.396 To the extent states fail to do so, this theory argues that 
courts should apply heightened scrutiny to qualification-based burdens on 
the franchise.397 If courts strike states’ restrictive qualification standards 
under the Voter Qualifications Clause, these standards cannot then 
override Elections Clause legislation protecting voters. 
As discussed in the preceding subsection, the weakness in this first 
theory is that it relies on courts to police restrictive voter qualifications. 
The judiciary’s mixed record of protecting voting rights when faced with 
 
 395. See Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 373–81. 
 396. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 161–63. 
 397. See id. at 205. 
2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1217 
constitutional claims398 suggests that a theory relying on judicial 
enforcement may not suffice to combat restrictive state voter qualifications 
standards. The Nineteenth Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority 
to Congress may give the Nineteenth Amendment an advantage. 
The second theory posits that the Elections Clause itself (rather than 
the Voter Qualifications Clauses) empowers Congress (rather than courts) 
to override state voter qualifications rules in two limited circumstances “so 
that states cannot use their power over voter qualifications to undermine 
the legitimacy and health of federal elections.”399 The first circumstance 
arises when states enact voter qualification standards in order to reduce 
participation in federal elections.400 The second circumstance involves 
states seeking to indirectly obtain the same result via voter qualifications 
rules with vague or undefined terms, allowing election administrators or 
other third parties to interpret the qualifications in a manner hostile to 
voting rights.401 
One scholar argues that this second theory might enable Congress to 
prohibit states from conditioning the restoration of voting rights on the 
payment of financial obligations associated with a criminal conviction or 
from disenfranchising voters using an unduly broad list of disqualifying 
crimes.402 To the extent that states have used their voter qualifications rules 
to exclude servicemembers from the political process, this theory might 
strengthen UOCAVA, the SCRA’s voting provision, and several of the 
legislative proposals concerning military voting against state claims that 
these federal statutes (and legislative proposals) infringe on a states’ right 
to set and enforce their voter qualifications. However, disenfranchisement 
of military voters mostly occurs as a result of legislative oversight and 
administrative inefficiency, rather than a concerted effort to exclude 
servicemembers from the polls.403 
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Under either the first theory (states’ affirmative obligation under the 
Voter Qualifications Clauses to protect voting rights) or the second theory 
(congressional Elections Clause authority to protect federal elections’ 
health and legitimacy), Elections Clause legislation must jump additional 
hurdles in order to overcome the state’s power to set voter qualifications 
in the event of a conflict. In other words, these two theories limit 
congressional authority to counteract restrictive state voter qualifications 
rules to the circumstances described in the theories. The Nineteenth 
Amendment holds an advantage in this regard because it requires no such 
showing: so long as the enforcement legislation falls within the ambit of 
the Woman Suffrage Amendment, state voter qualifications standards 
must yield to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. 
Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment itself alters 
state voting qualifications to the extent those qualifications impose 
restrictions on account of sex.404 Both the legislative history of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, as well as inferences from the state of analogous 
Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence at the time of the Sixty-sixth 
Congress, confirm that altering state voter qualifications was the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s primary purpose. 
The Sixty-sixth Congress repeatedly made clear that it expected the 
Nineteenth Amendment would override state voter qualifications 
excluding women from eligibility to vote. For instance, House Joint 
Resolution 1 contains a descriptive clause, reading, “Proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution extending the right of suffrage to 
women.”405 The brief report of the House’s Committee on Woman 
Suffrage—numbering only forty-four words—contains identical 
language.406 
The committee reports of earlier Congresses—much lengthier than 
forty-four words—centrally featured discussion concerning whether, as a 
policy matter, women ought to be eligible to vote.407 Those committees 
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 405. H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong., 41 Stat. 362 (1919). 
 406. H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, at 1 (1919)). 
 407. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 65-219, pt. 2, at 2 (1917) (minority 
views); S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 2 (1916); S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 3 (1913). 
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had for years heard testimony about the issue.408 This policy question 
featured prominently in debate in both chambers.409 
That legislative history is buttressed by the state of Fifteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence as it stood at the time of the Sixty-sixth 
Congress. By 1919, the Court had held that the Fifteenth Amendment 
directly abrogated certain state voter qualifications by automatically 
excising the word “white” from all state voter eligibility requirements.410 
In two additional decisions, the Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment 
invalidated even a facially race-neutral state voter qualification, where the 
qualification effectively abridged the right to vote of only newly freed 
slaves and their descendants.411 Indeed, the Court in one of the decisions 
found that the Fifteenth Amendment invalidated even a second voter 
qualification that had no race-related effects, because the second 
qualification was so intertwined with the first as part of the entire voter 
qualification regime that one part could not stand without the other.412 
In light of the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s legislative history and 
the state of the jurisprudence of the similarly-worded Fifteenth 
Amendment at the time of House Joint Resolution 1’s adoption, the 
evidence demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress understood that it was 
altering state voter qualifications on a nationwide scale. Shortly after 
ratification, the Supreme Court agreed that the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
reach extended to voter qualifications.413 
Given the provision’s reach into to state voter qualifications, 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation affecting state voter 
qualifications rules stands on a stronger foundation than similar legislation 
enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause. Unlike the Elections Clause, the 
Nineteenth Amendment itself alters state voter qualifications regulations 
to the extent those qualifications impose restrictions on account of sex. 
Enforcement legislation may therefore reach state voter qualifications 
requirements—and may do so in ways beyond merely requiring states to 
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abide by the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s operative prohibition.414 This 
ability advantages the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power over 
the Elections Clause’s more restricted authority for Congress to abrogate 
state voter qualifications standards in only limited circumstances. 
2. War Powers415 
The congressional War Powers have traditionally served as the 
constitutional basis for both pre-UOCAVA and pre-SCRA safeguards for 
military voting.416 One might argue that those War Powers also suffice to 
justify UOCAVA, the SCRA’s voting protections, and military voting 
legislative proposals.417 At best, the War Powers offer an uncertain basis 
for some of these provisions, suggesting the necessity of the Nineteenth 
Amendment as a source of constitutional authority. 
i. Continuity of Government 
To be clear, Congress possesses substantial authority under its War 
Powers to legislate concerning domestic policy.418 The Supreme Court has 
recently gone so far as to say that the “outer boundaries of [the] war powers 
[remain] undefined.”419 Scholarship even argues that in unique 
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circumstances, the War Powers permit Congress to modify  
constitutional election requirements—or even obviate the requirement to 
hold elections at all.420 
However, the literature concedes that this extraordinary authority to 
modify constitutional election requirements exists only “to ensure 
continuity of government” and “can be resorted to only when the normal 
procedures fail” due to a military conflict on domestic soil that frustrates 
standard democratic processes.421 This is consistent with early War Powers 
caselaw, which conditioned the validity of Civil War-era domestic 
legislation on the statute’s necessity during actual wartime.422  
A constitutional authority contingent on the existence of military 
conflict—especially if the conflict must represent an existential threat to 
the nation—would not justify UOCAVA’s and the SCRA’s permanent, 
peacetime intrusion into state election rules. 
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses 
While the War Powers do authorize Congress to protect military 
personnel even during peacetime, the extent to which this authority covers 
the right to vote remains an open question. On one hand, the Supreme 
Court has held that the War Powers authorize Congress to enact the 
provision in the SCRA’s predecessor statute shielding servicemembers 
against simultaneous taxation by multiple states.423 The SCRA’s current 
voting language tracks the former statute’s taxation language that the 
Court upheld.424 Testimony before Congress argued that the voting 
protection might therefore survive judicial scrutiny.425 On the other hand, 
the Court’s decision upholding the pre-SCRA tax protection relied on 
cases authorizing the federal government to protect its operations  
and functions—including its agents—from state taxation.426 This 
principle—known as intergovernmental tax immunity—reaches back over 
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two centuries.427 No similar principle exists allowing the federal 
government to protect the voting domicile of its agents from state voter 
qualifications rules. 
Instead, the Voter Qualifications Clauses bestow on states the power 
to fix the qualifications of their voters.428 What happens when this  
state power faces off against the congressional War Powers? The answer 
is unclear. 
On one hand, congressional authority derived from Article I—like 
the War Powers—may prove no match for the state’s sovereign 
prerogative to determine the bounds of its electorate. The Supreme Court 
has never decided whether any provision of Article I empowers Congress 
to abrogate state voter qualifications standards. However, the Court has 
developed a substantial jurisprudence concerning congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.429 Both immunity from private 
lawsuits and the right to set suffrage requirements are important attributes 
of state sovereignty.430 Sovereign immunity jurisprudence, therefore,  
may shed light on congressional authority to override state voter 
qualifications rules. 
The sovereign immunity jurisprudence does not favor Congress. The 
Supreme Court recently decided that no Article I power enables Congress 
to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity.431 In its earlier decisions, the 
Court held that while Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
could subject a state to private suits without the state’s consent, neither 
limited Article I authorities like the patent power nor substantial Article I 
authorities like the power over American Indian tribes could do so.432 
The Supreme Court’s ruling concerning the Indian Commerce 
Clause holds particular relevance because that provision “grants Congress 
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that 
[the Supreme Court has] consistently described as ‘plenary and 
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exclusive.’”433 In this regard, the Indian Commerce Clause resembles the 
War Powers. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, lower 
courts almost unanimously agree that the War Powers do not authorize 
Congress to pierce state sovereign immunity for private plaintiffs.434 If 
even considerable Article I powers like the “plenary and exclusive” Indian 
Commerce Clause authority or the substantial War Powers do not allow 
Congress to invade a state’s sovereign prerogative of immunity from suit, 
these powers may not allow Congress to invade a state’s sovereign 
prerogative to set the qualifications of its voters. 
Some scholarship suggests that a “state[‘s] interest” in “conduct[ing] 
its own elections”—presumably including the state’s right to set voter 
qualifications rules—”is arguably less weighty than the abrogation of 
sovereign immunity.”435 This suggestion may undervalue the state’s 
sovereignty interest in determining the bounds of the franchise.436 If, as the 
Supreme Court has held, a state’s power to determine the qualifications of 
its governing officers implicates the most fundamental nature of 
sovereignty,437 then the same might hold true of a state’s power to 
determine the qualifications of its voters—who, after all, are the ultimate 
source of state power. Indeed, the Court itself has drawn this 
comparison.438 Additionally, the scholarship’s suggestion fails to consider 
the degree to which federal intrusions into state voter qualification regimes 
impose other federalism costs.439 Courts may conceivably determine  
that the states’ sovereignty interest in determining the qualifications  
 
 433. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (quoting Washington v. Confed. Bands & 
Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979)). 
 434. See, e.g., Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2000); Velasquez v. 
Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir.), vacated on unrelated grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(per curiam); Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 362–63 (Ala. 
2001); Janowski v. Div. of State Police, Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 981 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Del. 
2009); Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 5–7 (Va. 2016). Contra Diaz-Gandia v. 
Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 509, 616 (1st Cir. 1996). Commentators—writing before Allen in 2020—
disagree, arguing that the War Powers do authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
See Timothy M. Harner, The Soldier and the State: Whether the Abrogation of State Sovereign 
Immunity in USERRA Actions Is a Valid Exercise of the Congressional War Powers, 195 MIL. L. REV. 
91, 125 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees 
from State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 999, 1050 (2004). 
 435. Developments in the Law, Securing Indian Voting Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1754 
(2016). This scholarship makes this argument in the context of justifying voting rights legislation 
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. 
 436. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009). 
 437. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redist’g Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 816–17 (2015). 
 438. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). 
 439. See Mortellaro, supra note 388, at 455–66. 
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for suffrage meets or even exceeds their sovereignty interest in immunity 
from suit. 
On the other hand, a state’s sovereignty interest in determining who 
qualifies to vote may be weakest when the state uses its authority to 
restrict, rather than expand, suffrage. As discussed earlier, existing 
scholarship argues that the Voter Qualifications Clauses may impose an 
affirmative obligation on states to safeguard the right to vote.440 If this 
affirmative obligation limits states’ power under the Voter Qualifications 
Clauses to curtail access to the franchise,441 then states may possess only 
a minimal sovereignty interest in setting restrictive voter qualification 
rules. If the state’s sovereignty interest is minimal, the War Powers may 
suffice to overcome that interest. 
In short, whether the War Powers empower Congress to override the 
states’ explicit constitutional authority under the Voter Qualifications 
Clauses remains unclear.442 What is clear is that Article I—including the 
War Powers—does not authorize the same degree of intrusion into state 
sovereignty as the Reconstruction Amendments. This poses potential 
problems if the War Powers form the constitutional basis for the SCRA’s 
voting domicile protections or other legislative proposals that could 
interfere with state voter qualifications. Considering this uncertainty, the 
War Powers cannot entirely displace the need for other sources of 
constitutional authority. Because the Nineteenth Amendment empowers 
Congress to reach state voter qualifications,443 the Nineteenth Amendment 
may hold an advantage over the War Powers. 
iii. Non-Federal Elections 
If the War Powers do not justify the SCRA’s modification of state 
rules governing voter qualifications, Congress may argue that its War 
Powers at least authorize UOCAVA’s time, place, and manner regulations 
as applied to non-federal elections.444 However, this argument may also be 
in doubt: because the Elections Clause explicitly limits congressional 
authority to “Elections for Senators and Representatives,”445 that  
may suggest that other provisions of Article I—including the War 
 
 440. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 161–62; supra Section 
IV.C.1.ii. 
 441. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 205. 
 442. See, e.g., Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 130 n.9 (2001) (Leval, J., writing separately); id. 
at 134 n.7 (Walker, C.J., concurring). 
 443. See supra Section IV.C.1.ii. 
 444. No serious dispute exists over congressional authority under the Elections Clause to apply 
UOCAVA to federal elections. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 81, at 463; Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 
120, at 370; Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, supra note 366, at 864–65. 
 445. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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Powers—do not imply an unwritten congressional power over state and 
local elections.446 
This argument has arisen in another, similar context: whether the 
Elections Clause’s explicit grant of authority over congressional elections 
(without mentioning presidential elections) should suggest the absence of 
an unwritten power over presidential elections.447 For two reasons, the 
Supreme Court held that congressional power over congressional elections 
extends to presidential elections.448 
First, the Court conditioned its holding on the fact that the specific 
statute at issue was “confined to situations which, if not beyond the power 
of the state to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately. 
It in no sense invades any exclusive state power.”449 But states do not lack 
the capacity to administer their own elections.450 Likewise, the application 
of UOCAVA to non-federal elections likely intrudes on the states’ 
sovereign prerogatives to administer their own internal elections.451 
Second, the Court held that power over presidential elections 
constituted a type of implied “power essential to preserve the departments 
and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, 
whether threatened by force or by corruption.”452 But the 
disenfranchisement of military voters, while obviously repugnant to basic 
 
 446. Put another way, this argument applies the “canon of construction holding that to express 
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 447. Compare Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential 
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MIDWESTERN STATES 21–159 (2007); KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. R45549, 
THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 3–11 (2019); 
Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State Election 
Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 
361–80 (2008). 
 451. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009); William S. 
Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional 
Order, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 31; Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the 
Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1788 (2001); Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note 
148, at 399. 
 452. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545. 
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principles of democracy,453 does not create an existential threat against the 
federal government.454 
Accordingly, while the negative implication of the phrase “Elections 
for Senators and Representatives” does not prevent Congress from 
exercising authority over presidential elections,455 whether it bars 
Congress from exercising authority over non-federal elections remains 
unresolved. This open question demonstrates the potential need for other 
constitutional bases for military voting legislation. Because the Nineteenth 
Amendment does reach non-federal elections,456 the provision may 
provide a stronger constitutional footing for UOCAVA and other time, 
place, and manner regulations that support military voters. 
3. Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power457 
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power provides another 
potential source of congressional authority to combat felon 
disenfranchisement and protect military voters. However, questions attend 
the provision’s application in either domain.458 The Nineteenth 
Amendment provides a better constitutional authority for attacking these 
two issues. 
The Supreme Court has held that felon disenfranchisement generally 
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.459 Scholars have exhaustively 
covered both this decision and the broader interplay between the 
Fourteenth Amendment and felon disenfranchisement.460 Much of this 
scholarship specifically contends that Congress could not constitutionally 
abrogate state felon disenfranchisement via its Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 453. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965); Karlan, Ballots and Bullets, supra 
note 90, at 1346. 
 454. Cf. Prakash, supra note 420, at 1392–95. 
 455. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544–47. 
 456. Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment contains no language limiting its 
application to federal elections. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1., with U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, 
para. 1. 
 457. “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 5. 
 458. For instance, consider the interplay between sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
does section 2’s extraordinary congressional authority to reduce a state’s representation in the House 
suggest that courts should read the congressional section 5 enforcement power more broadly? 
Compare Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note 148, at 401, and Franita Tolson, What Is 
Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 440 (2015), with Crum, 
Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1618–19, and Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the 
Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 331. As 
noted below, a full exposition on the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 459. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). 
 460. See supra Section I.A. 
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enforcement power.461 While a complete analysis of this enforcement 
power’s reach is beyond the scope of this Article, the existing scholarship 
demonstrates that, at minimum, constitutional questions would attend 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation abrogating state felon 
disenfranchisement laws. The Nineteenth Amendment may offer a better 
constitutional tool for Congress to address voting by individuals with 
criminal convictions. 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to protect military 
voters is another matter. No litigation has challenged whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment could justify the voting protections military voters 
receive under UOCAVA and the SCRA. The literature has not covered the 
topic. However, some scholars have argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power does not justify the enactment of 
UOCAVA as it pertains to the legislation’s non-military constituency: 
overseas civilians.462 As one of those scholars notes, “many of the 
constitutional arguments against [UOCAVA’s statutory predecessor] and 
UOCAVA apply with equal force to [military voters].”463 
For instance, one argument contends that legislation to enfranchise 
non-resident overseas civilians does not constitute a constitutionally valid 
remedy to the problem of residency restrictions on the franchise because 
bona fide residency requirements do not violate the Constitution.464 As 
applied to military voters, this argument would contend that the SCRA’s 
protection of servicemembers’ voting domicile likewise cannot abrogate 
state voting domicile rules because bona fide residency requirements do 
not violate the Constitution, even as applied to military voters.465 
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment could justify the SCRA’s 
voting provision is an open question. Courts subject Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation to congruence-and-proportionality 
review,466 which proceeds in three stages. First, courts must identify the 
constitutional right that Congress sought to enforce with its legislation.467 
Second, courts review the legislative record for a history and pattern of 
 
 461. Clegg et al., Case Against, supra note 61, at 14–16; Clegg et al., The Bullet and the Ballot?, 
supra note 284, at 19–22; Hasen, Uncertain Congressional Power, supra note 54, at 779–83; Re & 
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 462. See Kalt, supra note 81, at 462–73, 485–86; Gura, supra note 81, at 192–94. 
 463. Kalt, supra note 81, at 502. 
 464. Id. at 486. 
 465. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–94 (1965); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of 
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343–44 (1972). 
 466. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–36 (1997). 
 467. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001), 
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recent state violations of that right.468 Finally, courts review the legislation 
itself to determine whether Congress chose means appropriately tailored 
to the targeted constitutional harm.469 While enforcement legislation may 
proscribe state conduct that does not itself violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment in order to more effectively deter and remedy conduct that 
does, Congress may not redefine the substantive scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.470 The range of state conduct affected by the 
legislation, statutory limits imposed on the legislation, the depth of the 
legislation’s intrusion into state sovereignty, financial cost, and the 
availability of potential alternative remedies all factor into whether the 
legislation constitutes a congruent and proportional exercise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.471 
With regard to the initial inquiry, Congress might stand a better 
chance at justifying the SCRA’s protection of servicemember voting 
domicile if it characterized the provision as enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment right of bona fide residents to register and vote, 
notwithstanding the absences occasioned by the obligations of their 
military service.472 In other words, Congress would argue that the SCRA 
attacks only unconstitutionally restrictive residency requirements,473 but 
not bona fide residency requirements. 
Next, Congress would have to discover sufficient evidence of 
unconstitutionally restrictive residency requirements. This would require 
canvassing state law and potentially reviewing state election practices and 
procedures to determine whether military voters face difficulty registering 
and voting on account of their service-related absences from their voting 
domiciles. 
Assuming Congress develops a sufficient record, the next step in the 
congruence-and-proportionality analysis would be to determine whether 
Congress sufficiently tailored the SCRA’s remedy to these constitutional 
violations. Whether the SCRA’s voting language would survive this 
analysis remains unclear. 
On one hand, Congress has long possessed authority under its 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to abrogate state voter 
 
 468. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 37 (2012) (plurality opinion); 
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qualification rules—like states’ restriction of the franchise to bona fide 
residents—even if those rules themselves comport with the 
Constitution.474 Additionally, testimony before Congress suggested that 
the SCRA’s voting provision would withstand constitutional scrutiny 
because the voting language merely enforced servicemembers’ right to 
register and vote in their place of domicile, even if military absences took 
them elsewhere.475 This strengthens the case for upholding the SCRA’s 
voting provision because existing equal protection jurisprudence forbids 
states from using residency requirements to disenfranchise 
servicemembers because of their military service.476 If the SCRA 
nonetheless protected some servicemembers lacking bona fide residency, 
Congress could argue this overbreadth was appropriate to preclude 
challenges to servicemembers who do qualify as bona fide residents. 
On the other hand, the congressional testimony cited above—which 
dates from three weeks before the introduction of congruence-and-
proportionality jurisprudence477—minimizes the scope of the SCRA’s 
voting provision. Congress enacted this voting language in the wake of 
litigation showing that servicemembers were registering and voting in 
locations in which the servicemembers had no plausible claim to bona fide 
residency.478 The legislation imposes its will not only in federal elections, 
but also state and local elections, and contains no internal limits on its 
application.479 Additionally, the SCRA’s intrusion into state rules 
governing voter qualifications may impose substantial sovereignty and 
other federalism costs.480 Less intrusive measures may be available to 
protect bona fide residents from losing their voting domicile due to 
military-connected absences.481 In short, the question of whether the 
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 481. For instance, Congress could have shifted the burden to states (and off servicemembers) to 
establish that a servicemember has gained, lost, or changed his or her voting domicile. Cf. Steve Barber 
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SCRA’s voting provision constitutes a congruent and proportional remedy 
admits of no clear answer. Given this uncertainty, the Nineteenth 
Amendment offers a more stable constitutional basis for the SCRA’s 
voting provision. 
This same analysis attends UOCAVA’s facilitation of absentee 
voting for military personnel, or the proposed UOCAVA amendment to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity by permitting a private cause of action. 
Even if Congress might plausibly justify UOCAVA’s application to non-
federal elections as legislation to enforce the right to vote as protected by 
the Equal Protection Clause,482 the statute must still undergo the 
demanding Fourteenth Amendment standard of review. The deferential 
standard of review afforded Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation483 offers a substantial advantage over similar legislation 
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. Twenty-sixth Amendment Enforcement Power484 
Congress might also attempt to use its Twenty-sixth Amendment 
enforcement power to combat felon disenfranchisement or bolster military 
voting. The Twenty-sixth Amendment enforcement power shares many of 
the same advantages as the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power. 
For instance, like the Nineteenth Amendment, “the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment can be used by Congress to prohibit conduct that has a 
discriminatory effect even absent a discriminatory purpose.”485 Just as the 
demanding congruence and proportionality test does not apply to 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, a lenient, forgiving 
standard of review likewise applies to Twenty-sixth Amendment 
enforcement legislation.486 Also similar to the Nineteenth Amendment, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment’s scope directly modifies state voter 
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 483. See supra Section part IV.B. 
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 485. Fish, supra note 65, at 1216. 
 486. See id. at 1224–29. 
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qualifications rules and permits intrusion into state and local election rules, 
exceeding the Elections Clause’s more limited authority over regulations 
of the time, place, and manner of federal elections.487 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment might therefore make a good source 
of constitutional authority for protecting the voting rights of military 
personnel. Just as the military is overwhelmingly male, “[a]ctive-duty 
military personnel are substantially younger than the population at 
large.”488 The enactment histories of both the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth 
Amendments share a common theme: support for the new  
constitutional provisions in light of the to-be-enfranchised population’s 
contributions to a war effort.489 Accordingly, the Nineteenth and Twenty-
sixth Amendments might serve as equally plausible sources of 
constitutional authority for enforcement legislation to protect 
servicemembers’ voting rights. 
However, the Twenty-sixth Amendment’s power to combat felon 
disenfranchisement is less clear. In order for Congress to constitutionally 
enact Twenty-sixth Amendment enforcement legislation, the age 
discrimination in question must be sufficient for Congress to “draw a 
rational connection between the protections it is enacting and the general 
goal of combating age discrimination.”490 This may not be the case for 
felon disenfranchisement: “While felons are slightly younger than the 
general population, the difference between the average age of a felon and 
the average age of the general population [may be] too small to draw a 
rational connection between age discrimination and the abolition of felon 
disenfranchisement.”491 
D. Caselaw: Howard v. Gilmore 
A fourth objection might suggest that Howard v. Gilmore forecloses 
any Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to abrogate state 
felon disenfranchisement provisions. In an unpublished decision, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a pro se litigant’s 
Nineteenth Amendment claim almost in passing, using a mere seventy-
three words: 
 
 487. See id. at 1174–77. 
 488. Id. at 1219. As of 2004, “41% of active-duty military [were] twenty-four years old or 
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 489. See id. 
 490. See id. at 1229. 
 491. Id. at 1229–30. “In 2006, the median age of felons convicted in state court was thirty-one 
at the time of sentencing (with a mean sentence length of four years and eleven months), while the 
median age of the general population [in 2012 was] 36.9.” Id. at 1230 n.273. 
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To the extent that Howard relies upon the Nineteenth Amendment, 
he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 
Nineteenth Amendment prohibits denying the franchise based 
upon the basis of sex. Howard makes no attempt to frame his claim 
in terms of discrimination based upon sex. The Nineteenth 
Amendment is therefore inapplicable and the district court 
correctly dismissed the complaint to the extent it relies upon the 
Nineteenth Amendment.492 
For three reasons, this decision cannot be a serious bar to Nineteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation on felon disenfranchisement. 
First, the Fourth Circuit itself treats unpublished decisions as 
nonprecedential, negating Howard’s contribution to Nineteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.493 Second, to the extent the decision has any 
force, Howard concerns only whether a litigant may use the Nineteenth 
Amendment to prohibit states from disenfranchising voters on the  
basis of a criminal conviction.494 The Fourth Circuit’s decision says 
nothing about whether the Woman Suffrage Amendment empowers 
Congress to abrogate state felon disenfranchisement provisions by 
enforcement legislation. 
But the most important reason to doubt Howard’s impact is its 
holding: that a Nineteenth Amendment claim which “makes no attempt to 
frame [the] claim in terms of discrimination based upon sex” cannot 
succeed.495 In other words, Howard stands for the unremarkable 
proposition—well-established in the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere—that 
“perfunctory and undeveloped claim[s]” without sufficient evidence or 
argument in support will fail.496 The Fourth Circuit’s decision is therefore 
best understood as a routine application of standard litigation principles 
rather than a groundbreaking exposition on the contours of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. This is especially true when considering both the decision’s 
brevity and its nonprecedential status. Accordingly, Howard does not limit 
congressional authority to enforce the Nineteenth Amendment. 
 
 492. Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (per 
curiam) (unpublished table disposition). Howard dealt specifically with felon disenfranchisement, 
making it particularly noteworthy in this Article. But much of this analysis applies to the multitude of 
other decisions addressing undeveloped, conclusory arguments—generally made by pro se litigants—
concerning the Nineteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Newark Hous. Auth., 515 F. App’x 
122, 125 (3d Cir. 2013); Chapman v. Baker, 430 F. App’x 731, 731 (10th Cir. 2011); New v. Pelosi, 
374 F. App’x 158, 159 (2d Cir. 2010); Kohnke v. Reed, 18 F.3d 936, 1994 WL 83724, at *1 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished table decision). 
 493. See, e.g., Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017); see also 4TH 
CIR. R. 32.1. 
 494. See Howard, 2000 WL 203984, at *1. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Russell v. Absolute Collect’n Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 n.* (4th Cir. 2014). 
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E. Politics: The Unlikelihood of Restrictive State Action 
Finally, one last objection might argue that Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation, even if constitutionally viable, is unnecessary. 
Given the widespread political support for military voting and the 
increasing unpopularity of felon disenfranchisement, the argument goes, 
states will protect the voting rights of these two groups without any need 
for federal legislation. This argument neglects two realities: first, that 
political popularity vacillates over time, and second, that state bureaucratic 
inertia can defeat even politically popular policy initiatives. Federal 
legislation may still be necessary if Congress wants to ensure felons’ and 
servicemembers’ voting rights withstand the ebbs and flows of both 
popular opinion and competence in public administration. 
To be clear, “support for reinstating felons’ right to vote appears to 
be gaining momentum across the political spectrum.”497 But despite the 
trend, the restoration of voting rights for individuals convicted of crimes 
remains controversial.498 Views vary widely based on party affiliation.499 
This matters because “partisan politics drives changes to the state laws 
governing felon voter eligibility.”500 In other words, the fate of felon 
disenfranchisement policy may depend on the shifting electoral fortunes 
of the major political parties. If Congress wants to see action in this area, 
it cannot rely on the rising unpopularity of felon disenfranchisement to 
prompt unilateral action by states. 
Unlike felon disenfranchisement, military voting enjoys widespread 
support across the political spectrum.501 This popularity is unsurprising. 
Political support for servicemember voting has often peaked during wars 
involving overseas deployment of large numbers of military personnel.502 
Today, the United States remains mired in “the longest period of hostilities 
in U.S. history—a period that some have dubbed the Forever Wars.”503 
However, the unprecedented support for military voting is a recent 
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development, historically speaking. In the early part of American history, 
states actively sought to disenfranchise military voters.504 As late as 1965, 
states burdened servicemembers’ right to vote—or even outright barred 
them from the polling place—because of their service.505 More recent 
litigation has challenged military ballots with the hope of tipping a close 
election result.506 In short, even the modern consensus in support of 
military voting has its limits. 
Additionally, the political popularity of military voters will not 
mitigate the challenges military voters face as a consequence of the unique 
nature of election administration in the United States: 
[Military] voting difficulties persist in part because elections 
continue to be conducted at the state level, and voting procedures 
vary widely across states. These state differences have made it 
harder for various groups and individuals, including the [Federal 
Voting Assistance Program], military voting assistance offices, 
voting assistance officers, state department officials, and non-
governmental organizations, to help individual voters navigate the 
particular requirements applicable to them individually. In 
addition, the federal overlay on state election administration adds 
complexity and increases the risk of problems . . . .507 
Even garden-variety state bureaucratic friction—whether between 
state agencies, between the state political branches, or between state and 
local governments508—can interfere with successful state administration 
of military voting. No matter how much popular support servicemembers 
enjoy, election officials may nonetheless fail to effectively execute their 
duties relating to military voting due to communication breakdowns, 
explicit conflicts, or even misunderstandings over the proper allocation of 
responsibilities.509 If Congress wants to see action in this area, it cannot 
rely on the consensus support of military voting to prompt unilateral action 
by states. 
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CONCLUSION 
Felons and servicemembers each face unique but serious barriers to 
the ballot. The Nineteenth Amendment empowers Congress to address 
those barriers in light of the sex-based burden both groups face. 
This may prove to be an unconventional conclusion, given that “[t]he 
prevailing understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment is that it merely 
requires that women be permitted to vote—no more, no less.”510 But “the 
conventional wisdom is wrong.”511 While the Sixty-sixth Congress 
initially aimed the Woman Suffrage Amendment at women’s right to vote, 
its gender-neutral language establishes (and later Supreme Court 
precedent confirms) that the Nineteenth Amendment protects men, as 
well. Because men make up an overwhelming proportion of both voters 
with criminal convictions and voters serving in the armed forces, the 
Nineteenth Amendment could serve as a powerful constitutional tool to 
protect these groups’ voting rights. A review of the primary concerns 
animating the Sixty-sixth Congress to propose the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment to the states confirms this hypothesis, given how each of the 
concerns dovetails with the nature of the population burdened by either 
felon disenfranchisement or military service. Additionally, many of the 
restrictions attendant to other constitutional provisions—a requirement for 
intentional discrimination, a heightened standard of review, a limited 
reach into state voter qualifications or non-federal election procedures—
do not apply to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. 
Yet for a century after ratification of the Woman Suffrage 
Amendment, its Enforcement Clause has remained dormant. Congress has 
never taken advantage of its “power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”512 After 100 years of inaction, this symposium on the 
centennial of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment marks an 
appropriate time to reexamine the provision. To answer the question in this 
Article’s title—Does the Woman Suffrage Amendment Protect the Voting 
Rights of Men?—yes. If Congress chooses to take action on felon 
disenfranchisement or military voting, the Nineteenth Amendment offers 
a potent tool for doing so. 
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